Self-protecting digital content

ABSTRACT

Technologies are disclosed to transfer responsibility and control over security from player makers to content authors by enabling integration of security logic and content. An exemplary optical disc carries an encrypted digital video title combined with data processing operations that implement the title&#39;s security policies and decryption processes. Player devices include a processing environment (e.g., a real-time virtual machine), which plays content by interpreting its processing operations. Players also provide procedure calls to enable content code to load data from media, perform network communications, determine playback environment configurations, access secure nonvolatile storage, submit data to CODECs for output, and/or perform cryptographic operations. Content can insert forensic watermarks in decoded output for tracing pirate copies. If pirates compromise a player or title, future content can be mastered with security features that, for example, block the attack, revoke pirated media, or use native code to correct player vulnerabilities.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation-in-part of application Ser. No.10/113,363, filed Mar. 27, 2002, which claims the benefit of ProvisionalApplication No. 60/279,323, filed Mar. 28, 2001.

FIELD

This application relates generally to securing the distribution ofdigital content against piracy and other unauthorized use orredistribution.

BACKGROUND

A wide variety of systems have been proposed for protecting digitalcontent. Most such schemes encrypt the content to protect it againstunauthorized use and copying while it is stored on media or sent overuntrusted communication channels. Decryption algorithms and keys arethen managed by trusted, tamper-resistant software or hardware modules,which are designed to enforce access control rules (which may be fixedor configurable) specifying how the content can be used.

Content protection schemes are generally customized for a particularplayback environment. For example, anti-piracy systems in software-onlystreaming content players designed for personal computers lack thesecurity benefits of tamper resistant hardware but can generally beupgraded without great difficulty (e.g., if the user uninstalls theplayer and downloads an updated version from the manufacturer web site).As a result, such systems may provide less robust security thanhardware-based players, but the consequences of an attack are relativelysmall since upgraded security features can be deployed by modifying thecontent stream and requiring that users upgrade their software.

In contrast, protection methods embedded in consumer electronicshardware devices that play optical media are notoriously difficult toupgrade. Security challenges include the long lifetime of optical media(which prevents security upgrades that are not backward-compatible), thelack of a convenient and reliable way to deliver updates to players, andthe lack of standardization between player implementations. Thesedifficulties, combined with the long lifetime of playback devices andthe consumer expectation that all new content will play on old players,make it extremely difficult to introduce security upgrades. As aconsequence, most consumer electronics devices provide little or no realprotection against copying, and the few content protection standardsthat are deployed in consumer electronics devices tend to be simple,rigid schemes that offer little flexibility and renewability. FIG. 1diagrams a typical content protection system of the background art.Content player 100 includes software in nonvolatile program memory 105,which implements the player's security policies 110, decryption code120, and player keys 130. This code and keys are used by processor 140to validate whether the content read from media 150 is valid and, if so,to decrypt the content and supply the results to output interface 160.Examples of protection systems like the one shown in FIG. 1 include thecopy control scheme used with digital audio tape, the content scramblingsystem (CSS) intended to protect DVD video, and the CPPM scheme proposedfor protecting DVD audio.

A variety of different technologies are known in the background art:

-   -   Access control policies: A wide variety of access policies, and        methods for specifying such policies, are known in the        background art. For example, the software protection system of        U.S. Pat. No. 4,658,093 to Hellman uses a straightforward        authorization code issued by a publisher. In contrast, U.S. Pat.        No. 5,982,891 to Ginter et al. describes a variety of very        complex access rules involving a large number of participants.        Standards for encoding access policies (both for use with        content distribution and other applications) have also been        proposed, such as PolicyMaker and the X.509 certificate format.    -   Anti-virus software: Methods for detecting and blocking known        viruses, Trojan horses, and other malicious code are well known        in the background art. These methods generally involve scanning        for attributes of known viruses, such as known instruction        sequences. These programs can work in a variety of ways, such as        scanning files during start-up, scanning files on-the-fly,        scanning programs as they execute, scanning memory, scanning new        media, scanning network communications, etc.    -   Content protection systems and DRMs: A wide variety of content        protection systems (which are also sometimes called Digital        Rights Management (DRM) systems) have been proposed. DRM systems        of the background art generally provide for content to be        distributed in encrypted form, then supply decryption keys or        perform decryption operations for legitimate purchasers. Many        features have been proposed or included in commercial DRMs,        including support for superdistribution (where encrypted content        can be exchanged between users), pay-per-use billing (including        off-line pay-per-use with reporting via a telephone line),        variable billing rates (charging different amounts based on        promotions, number or duration of uses, requested user        operations, user history, etc.), protection for various data        types (audio, video, text, software, etc.), support for various        formats, and support, for various playback device types        (portable, set-top, computer-based with hardware assistance,        software-only, etc.)    -   Copy protection: Methods for copy protecting personal computer        software are known and are widely deployed for some kinds of        software such as computer games. These methods often involve        binding a software program to physical media that are designed        to be difficult to copy (e.g., by intentionally incorporating        errors or nonstandard formatting that are difficult to        replicate). Other copy protection systems involve securing the        installation process, e.g. by requiring that users obtain an        authorization code from a server. In some cases, copy protection        features are designed into a system. In others cases (including        copy protection systems used for computer software,        videocassette tapes, and audio CDs), copy protection is        implemented by producing media with nonstandard encoding that        allows playback on most players but will confuse most attempts        to copy the media. A major design challenge for copy protection        systems is to minimize the impact on legitimate users (i.e.,        obtain high playability and user acceptance) while preventing        undesirable actions as effectively as possible (i.e., obtaining        good security).    -   Cryptographic functions: A wide variety of basic cryptographic        functions are known, including block ciphers, hash functions,        digital signature systems (and other public key systems), key        management systems, etc. For more information about basic        cryptography, see Applied Cryptography by Bruce Schneier.    -   Cryptographic oracles: Using block ciphers or other        cryptographic functions, it is possible to construct        “cryptographic oracles” which apply a secret cryptographic        transformation to arbitrary externally-supplied input messages        and return the results. Cryptographic oracles can be constructed        so that it is computationally infeasible for an attacker who        knows the oracle's algorithms and protocols to determine the        oracle's keys. In addition, because the number of possible        inputs to an oracle can be extremely large (e.g., 2²⁵⁶ for an        oracle constructed from a 256-bit block cipher), it is not        feasible for an attacker to anticipate or pre-compute the        responses to random queries.    -   Interpreters emulators, and virtual machines: A variety of        interpreted computer languages are known in the background. Some        interpreted languages, such as Java, require a compilation        process to convert source code into an executable or        interpretable form. In contrast, most BASIC interpreters operate        directly on the source code. Some interpreters allow        self-modifying code, while others do not. Technology for        implementing interpreters and for emulating assembly languages        is also known in the background art. For example, sophisticated        emulators such as Virtual PC and SoftWindows can run programs        designed for Microsoft Windows on Apple Mac computers. Virtual        machine (VM) designs, such as those used for Java and JavaCard,        are known, and it is also known that VMs can interact with        native code on the computer, or call other VM functions in        different memory spaces. (Many Java implementations provide        these capabilities.) Interpreted languages are commonly used for        applications or where cross-platform compatibility is required,        such as for creating processor-independent device driver        formats. (See, for example, Writing FCode 2.x Programs, Sun        Microsystems, 1993, page 5.)    -   Key management: A wide variety of methods for assigning and        managing cryptographic keys have been proposed. It is known that        devices can have device-specific keys, group keys, public keys,        private keys, certificates, etc. Keys can be assigned to        individual devices, to selected groups of devices (e.g. as        described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,592,552 to Fiat), to all devices,        etc. Devices can contain a variety of keys of different types,        including symmetric keys, public keys (e.g., to verify        certificates and digital signatures) and asymmetric private        keys.    -   Media: Media technologies are known that can offer tremendous        storage capacity, low manufacturing cost, and good durability.        Examples of current media technologies include optical discs        (CD, DVD, etc.), magnetic media, flash memory, and ROMs. Newer        technologies, such as holographic memories, are also being        developed. It is known that a single piece of media can include        data of many different types. For example, a compact disc can        contain standard Red Book audio tracks as well as a data session        for use on personal computers (e.g., containing software,        compressed bonus tracks, images, videos, lyrics, etc.) Compact        discs for use for use in personal computers, can contain both        encrypted content as well as the playback software required to        play the content.    -   Network communication: Sophisticated data networks, including        the Internet, are known. These networks can provide flexible,        reliable, high-bandwidth data communication. Although networks        with a physical connection usually provide higher bandwidth,        wireless communication channels are also popular.    -   Renewable security: In some cases, it is not practical to        produce a security system that is guaranteed to be able to        prevent all possible attacks. As a result, it is desirable that        it be possible to renew security after an attack, e.g. by        discontinuing the use of any compromised keys and correcting the        vulnerability. Although renewable security is desirable, many        deployed and proposed systems lack any effective recovery        mechanism for many kinds of attacks.    -   Sandboxing: Sandboxing involves executing software programs in a        controlled environment where the program is unable to access any        operations that could damage the system. The Java “virtual        machine” supports sandboxing so that untrusted applets (such as        those downloaded over the Internet) can be executed.    -   Security modules: Many security systems employ removable        security modules so that the security upgrades can be performed        without the difficulty or expense of replacing other portions of        the system. For example, removable security modules are used in        many pay television systems.    -   Software updates: Secure software updates can be performed by        receiving a proposed software update, verifying a digital        signature or message authentication code validating the update,        then (if the signature is valid) performing the update. For        example, it is known that digital audio players can receive code        updates, verify digital signatures or message authentication        codes on the updates, and (if valid) update their code. Methods        for ensuring that updates are applied in the correct order        (e.g., using sequence counters) and for recovering from failed        or unsuccessful updates (e.g., by reverting to previous software        versions or by activating special recovery code) are also known.        It is also known that software updates can be delivered via        virtually a wide variety of distribution mechanisms, such as the        Internet, optical media, ROM cartridges, etc. Software updates        have been used to prevent pay television piracy by distributing        code updates with the signal to descramblers, which apply and        successfully execute the new code to compute the correct        decryption key for the next video segment. These updates are        commonly used to prevent unauthorized viewing by disabling or        even destroying unauthorized descramblers.    -   Steganoraphy: Steganography involves hiding information in data.        For example, it is known that encrypted data can be placed in        the least-significant bits of an image or sound recording. An        attacker who obtains this image or recording but does not know        the decryption key cannot even determine whether there is any        hidden data because low-order bits often appear random and        ciphertext produced by a strong encryption algorithm cannot be        distinguished from random data without the key.    -   Tamper resistance: Many methods are known for designing and        constructing devices that are resistant to attack. Tamper        resistant hardware is commonly used in systems where it is        desirable to prevent attackers from reverse engineering devices        or extracting keys from cryptographic modules. For example, Wave        Systems markets a tamper-resistant microprocessor-based        integrated circuit product called “Embassy” which can be        integrated with content players or general-purpose computers and        is advertised for use in securing the distribution of digital        content. Methods for implementing tamper resistant software have        also been proposed (see, for example, U.S. Pat. No. 5,892,899 to        Aucsmith et al.).    -   Traitor Tracing: Traitor tracing schemes have been proposed to        identify the source of compromises or attacks, typically by        tracing keys used in unauthorized devices back to a customer        particular or compromised device.    -   Watermarking: Watermarks are signals embedded in content that        can be detected by a specialized detector but do not affect (or        minimally affect) human perception of the content when played.        Watermarks embedded in pictures, sound recordings, and images        have been used by copyright holders to indicate that copying is        not authorized. “Robust” watermarks are known that can withstand        conversions between formats (including re-recording from analog        outputs) and provide varying degrees of security against attacks        attempting to remove the watermark. In contrast, “fragile”        watermarks have little or no ability to withstand format        conversions but are easier to design and can carry more        information.

Although no anti-piracy system can completely prevent all possibleattacks, systems of the background art fail to provide practicalsolutions to solvable problems such as casual piracy usingdigital-to-digital copying or high-speed ripping of protected formats tounprotected formats. Significant limitations of many systems of thebackground art include, without limitation:

-   -   Reliance on global secrets: Many protection systems require that        cryptographic algorithms, keys, and other information needed for        decoding be kept secret. As a result, the decoding process        cannot be documented in open standards documents without        compromising the security of the system. Also, if a large number        of implementations are available, attackers can potentially        break the entire scheme by attacking the weakest implementation.        (Such an attack recently occurred with the DVD video protection        system.) While such systems are useful in closed single-vendor        environments, they cannot be standardized and do not provide        effective long-term security.    -   Lack of standardization: Content publishers have already        committed to a variety of data formats and decryption algorithms        that are incompatible. Different content protection systems        enable different business models, and publishers who have        committed to one model are likely to oppose any security system        that requires a different model.    -   Incompatibility with product types: Many security features        cannot be integrated with all product types. For example,        downloadable software-only players for personal computers cannot        include tamper-resistant hardware. Similarly, frequent software        updates are difficult to deliver to players lacking Internet        connectivity.    -   User interface: Many proposals involve complex user interfaces.        Security should be invisible to honest users. Users are likely        to reject schemes that require explicit user involvement (e.g.,        to obtain or enter authorization codes). In general, consumer        electronics devices such as car stereos and video disc players        must be easy-to-use, since many users must be satisfied even if        they do not read documentation, are intimidated by technology,        have poor eyesight or other handicaps, or lack fluency in the        languages supported by the player.    -   Legal challenges: Some security systems require cooperation        between competitors. Such cooperation can be illegal due to        antitrust regulations.    -   Lack of manufacturer benefit: Manufacturers will oppose security        features that increase player cost, time-to-market, prevent the        inclusion of legitimate features, or otherwise make their        products less effective or desirable. Although advances in        semiconductor technology are decreasing the cost required to        implement security systems, effective tamper-resistant hardware        remains difficult and expensive to design and produce. As a        result, content protection systems that rely on manufacturers to        produce good implementations will fail unless they provide a        real marketplace advantage to manufacturers whose offerings are        more secure.    -   Indefinite security policies: Effective security systems must        specify rules or other decision-making procedures for        determining whether to allow or prevent user-requested specific        actions. In many systems, these rules or procedures are not well        specified.    -   Inflexible security policies: It is desirable for content        protection systems to have the flexibility to support different        models for different publishers, content types, jurisdictions,        playback environments, etc. Systems should offer the necessary        flexibility without becoming too complex.    -   Weak long-term security: Security systems must be robust and        flexible enough to remain effective for a long time. Few content        protection systems of the background art could last more than a        few years as part of a high-profile format, while a popular        format can last for more than 30 years.    -   Untraceability of attacks: If attacks do occur, systems should        be able to identify the source of the attack so that the        compromised (or misused) device can be revoked and so that        criminals can be prosecuted.

SUMMARY

The present application relates to various embodiments, and aspects, ofa standardizable content protection system that can be implemented in amanner providing flexible and renewable content protection across a widevariety of interoperable platforms. The system provides participants(manufacturers, publishers, artists, and/or consumers, etc.) withunparalleled flexibility to make decisions about security andfunctionality.

An exemplary player usable with the system (i.e., a device that wishesto decrypt or otherwise gain access to protected content) includesseveral components. The first is a data or media input interface, suchas for an optical disc drive. To initiate playback, the player loads asequence of data processing commands from the input interface and beginsexecuting these commands using an interpreter or other execution module.This execution environment preferably provides a Turing-completelanguage (one that can execute any algorithm, subject to the player'smemory, user interface, and performance limitations). From the executionenvironment, the content can query the player to determine theconfiguration of the playback environment and to perform cryptographicoperations using the player's keys. Content can thus be designed so thatplayback will only proceed on players that provide satisfactoryresponses to queries. Publishers can also provide limited playback. Forexample, less secure platforms could provide CD-quality stereo audio orregular-definition, images, while more secure platforms could offer moreaudio channels, high-definition images, higher sampling rates, andhigher-quality compression. Even after playback begins, playback canremain under the control of the content's data processing commands. Oneexemplary embodiment includes the capability to perform robust,essentially on-the-fly watermarking. Enabling the content itself tocontrol what data regions are played, makes it possible to embedinformation in the output by selecting between output data versions withtiny differences. Pirate copies can be traced back to a specific playerby analyzing these differences.

Because the content contains and enforces its own security policies,attacks that occur can be addressed by designing and issuing new contentthat is resistant. The flexibility afforded by allowing content toenforce its own security policies also allows support for artists'preferences, regional “fair use” regulations, etc. New player featurescan be added easily by adding new content-accessible player functions.

From a business perspective, it is desirable that any content protectionsystem be usable to unite content publishers and consumer electronicsmanufacturers in the common goal of providing the best possible securityconsistent with their business and operational constraints. The systemsdisclosed herein allow publishers to determine their own securityrequirements then allow the content itself to implement policies thatconsider a wide variety of factors and determine whether (or how) toplay in each environment. Also, manufacturers can be motivated to designproducts that offer good security and do not facilitate piracy so thattheir customers will have the broadest-possible access to content.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

FIG. 1 shows a media player using content protection methods of thebackground art.

FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary media player using content protectionmethods disclosed herein.

FIG. 3 illustrates the decryption portion of an exemplary embodiment.

FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of player method for securingaccess to a nonvolatile memory without requiring a centralized codesigning authority.

FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary validation process when attaching to anonvolatile memory slot.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/113,363 is herebyincorporated by reference in its entirety.

FIG. 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of a player using physical media200. The playback process is controlled by processor 210, which canaccess media 200 via media interface 205. When media 200 is mounted(e.g., when it is first inserted, or the system is re-initialized,etc.), processor 210 begins by initializing the media interface, readingthe media's table of contents, and recognizing the protection systemsupported. If so, the processor loads a small initial portion of media200 into execution and data RAM 220.

Using interpreter 215, processor 210 begins performing the dataprocessing operations specified by the loaded media portion. Interpreter215 provides a set of predetermined data processing operations fromwhich more complex tasks can be accomplished. The interpreted languageis preferably Turing-Complete. Turing-Complete programming languages arecharacterized in that algorithms implementable in one such language canbe implemented in any other, and the implementations will have similarasymptotic performance characteristics. Examples of Turing Completeprogramming languages include without limitation C, C++, BASIC, Fortran,Pascal, Java, and virtually all assembly languages.

The loaded portion proceeds by invoking procedure calls provided byinterpreter 215. Although the initial data loaded into RAM 220 may berelatively small, code running on interpreter 215 can load additionaldata (including code) from the media via procedure calls, therebyallowing more complex operations to be performed.

Other procedure calls allow the content to determine the playbackenvironment configuration 225. The content can thus analyze the playbackenvironment characteristics (e.g., player type, requested user action,etc.) to determine if playback should proceed. In an exemplaryembodiment, if correctable problems are detected (e.g., if the mediacontains a security firmware upgrade for the player), these can beaddressed. If supported, the content can also query output interface 250and, if supported, destination program/device 260 (e.g., amplifier,digital speakers, speaker driver, etc.) to check securitycharacteristics, load cryptographic keys, specify output parameters(e.g., to specify reduced output quality if security is uncertain), etc.

In an exemplary embodiment, the content can also query cryptographicoracles 230, which may be implemented in an external removable securitymodule 235 (such as a smart card, etc.) to allow for security hardwareupgrades. Oracles can also be implemented, without limitation, inprocessor 210, other hardware in the player, in media, in attacheddevices such as speakers, etc. Cryptographic oracles 230 can provide thecontent with verifiable proof of the player's identity. Results fromqueries to oracles 230 can be used in decrypting subsequent content orcode portions, thereby providing strong cryptographic assurance thatplayers lacking valid keys (or whose keys are revoked) cannot decryptthe content.

In an exemplary embodiment, the interpreter executes the data processingcommands specified by the content in a “sandbox,” meaning that thecontent does not have access to cryptographic secrets (such as oraclekeys) that could otherwise compromise the player. Sandboxing is usefulwhere not all content is necessarily trustworthy. For example, anattacker could try to produce malicious content that attempted toextract the cryptographic keys from players. (Additional informationabout exemplary cryptographic oracles and their operation is providedbelow.)

If the content determines that playback should not proceed (for exampleif a user is attempting to make a copy and the content is configured toprohibit copying), the content can report an error and reject therequested action. Alternatively, the content can control the renderingand/or output processes to reduce the quality of the output so thatunauthorized copies will be degraded and therefore less attractive.

If the content determines that playback should proceed, the content thenawaits a signal from the player specifying that playback should beginfrom a specific location on the media (e.g., a particular track).Interpreter 215 processes the request using the data processinginstructions loaded into execution/data RAM 220 when the media wasmounted. If the content decides that playback should proceed, it usesprocedure calls to direct media interface 205 to begin loading encryptedcontent from the appropriate location on media 200. The contentspecifies valid decryption keys and parameters to bulk decryption module240, which retrieves the encrypted content from RAM 220 (or,alternatively, directly from media interface 205) and decrypts it. Thedecrypted content is then supplied to output interface 250, whichconverts it to the appropriate analog or digital format for destinationprogram or device 260. As playback continues, the data processinginstructions being processed by interpreter 215 can load new decryptionparameters, specify new blocks of data to read from media 200, etc. Whenplayback completes, the content can re-initialize the RAM 220.

Additional information is provided in the following sections about theinterpreter, the playback system, and other embodiments and aspects.

Responding to Attacks

Anti-piracy systems implemented widely in software and in low-costconsumer electronics devices cannot prevent all possible attacks. Thetechniques disclosed herein are usable, following an attack, tofacilitate mastering new content in ways that substantially block theexisting attacks. While professional pirates may try to continuouslyseek out and install new circumvention systems, casual piracy willinvolve an ongoing struggle to develop and maintain attack tools andwill hopefully therefore be more difficult than simply purchasingcontent legitimately. The following sections describe how the techniquesdescribed herein can be used to address some common attacks.

A first category of attack involves attempts to use uncompromisedplayers to perform unauthorized actions. For example, content can bemastered to allow copying from original media but disallow copying fromcopies. If an attempt is made to copy such content from a copy (whichthe content could, for example, recognize by detecting modificationsinserted during the copying process or by comparing the current media'sserial number and/or type with the original), playback can be blocked bythe interpreter code. Alternatively, the interpreter can allow contentto play with reduced fidelity (such as playing stereo audio with a 44.1kilohertz sample rate even though multi-channel audio with a highersample rate might be available), or by inserting additional anti-piracywarnings. Thus, by analyzing information provided to the interpreter,inappropriate user requests can be detected and handled onnon-compromised players.

A second category of attack involves compromise of a player'scryptographic keys. If a player's cryptographic keys have beencompromised, an attacker could (at least in theory) emulate thecompromised playback environment completely by emulating thecryptographic oracles and (optionally) providing false responses toqueries about the playback environment. Security can be re-establishedafter such an attack by making the interpreted code in future contentrequire at least one cryptographic key that was not present in thecompromised device. If a particular player model or manufacturer is thesource of many attacks (e.g., because the player implementation hasinadequate security), publishers can create content that will not play(or will play at reduced quality) on such platforms.

A third category of attack involves compromising a particular piece ofcontent or a group of titles containing similar interpreter securitycode. Such attacks could potentially be mounted by modifying the contentitself to bypass security checks or by producing a malicious interpretertailored to play the target title. Such attacks can be addressed bydeploying different or better protection software in future content.

A fourth category of attack involves copying content from protectedmedia to unprotected formats, then redistributing the content in the newformat. No content protection system can completely prevent suchattacks, but the techniques and systems disclosed herein provide forpowerful, flexible watermarking capabilities that can be used to trace acompromise back to a particular device which can then be revoked toprevent future attacks. Because the number of users who actively uploadcontent for piracy is relatively small, piracy can be reducedsignificantly by identifying and revoking these users' players.Imperceptible differences can be introduced in the decryption output byselectively skipping portions of the ciphertext. For example, in anexemplary embodiment, the content can watermark a “zero” bit bydirecting the player's decryption module to decrypt and output a firstciphertext portion then skip a second ciphertext portion. To watermark a“one” bit, the content can direct the module to skip the firstciphertext portion and output the second one. By encoding a series ofsuch bits, the content can be watermarked with any data available to theinterpreter code, including without limitation the identity of theplayer, results of cryptographic operations, user action descriptions,output device information, etc. If a pirated copy of the content isdiscovered, the watermarks can be analyzed to trace the illegal copyback to a single player, which can then be revoked in future contentreleases. This capability is also useful for law enforcement andforensic purposes, since it is possible to prove with certainty that aparticular copy originated from a particular player. Features fortracing copies can also serve as a disincentive to piracy since peopleconsidering making illegal copies will be discouraged by the knowledgethat they could be identified, caught, and prosecuted.

Of course, no consumer-friendly anti-piracy system can reliably preventall possible attacks in all environments. For example, audio and videocan be recorded from analog outputs. (Even if watermarks are embedded incontent, recorders without watermark detectors are available.) Datacaptured from analog outputs can then be re-mastered onto new digital oranalog media and redistributed without the original's security features.Similarly, copies made by professional pirates who have equipmentrequired to make exact copies of media cannot be detected by the player,but the techniques and systems disclosed herein can help to preventmedia cloning. For example, disc manufacturer identifiers on media canbe checked by content to ensure that honest or careless duplicatingfacilities will not be duped by pirates. Media type identifiers canprevent content sold on read-only media from being redistributed onrecordable media. For players with Internet, telephone/modem, or othernetwork support, content can (for example) obtain authentication from aserver prior to playback (or the first playback) to validate that themedia is valid. Players with nonvolatile storage can even store a tableof known-bad media serial numbers, which the content and/or player canquery to determine whether the media has been revoked.

Querying and Controlling the Playback Environment

The content can be configured to decide whether it will allow itself tobe decoded. To assist with this decision, the player can provide thecontent with information about the playback environment. Although verylimited information (such as the user's requested action and the playermodel) may be adequate in many cases, more detailed and accurateinformation is desirable so that the content can make a more informedassessment as to whether playback should proceed. Although the specificinformation and capabilities provided to the content depend on theplayer implementation, the following describes (without limitation) someexemplary functions and capabilities that can be provided to content.Note that for players constructed out of multiple connected components(such as output ports, connected output devices, operating system devicedrivers, security modules, etc.), some or all of the followinginformation may be provided for these connected devices as well as themain part of the player containing the interpreter.

-   -   Security Support Information: Security specification version,        supported query functions, and/or security module form factor        (replaceable hardware, embedded hardware, updateable firmware,        ROM firmware, PC software, etc.), etc. (Exemplary cryptographic        processing functions and playback control/decryption functions        are discussed in detail below).    -   Manufacturer Information: Name, identifier, web site, public        key/certificate, manufacturing batch, manufacture date/time,        region of manufacture, country of manufacture, manufacturer        address, technical support contact information, and/or        manufacturer warranty information, etc.    -   Device Information: Product line, serial number, model number,        firmware/software versions, device public key/certificate        identifiers, GPS location or other physical location/region,        content supported Codec types, network/Internet support        information, network addresses, device telephone number, IP        address, watermark support, interpreter performance ratings,        security certification ratings, device distributor(s), device        retailer, device form factor, and/or security specifications,        etc.    -   User Information: User name, geographical region, country,        address, GPS location or other physical        location/region/country/etc., user telephone number, IP address,        e-mail address, web address, preferred language, tolerances for        controversial material, preferred payment methods/accounts,        payment limits, purchase history, and/or privacy preferences,        etc.    -   Media Control: Query media format, recordable vs.        non-recordable, media serial number, recording device type,        recording device owner, recording device serial number,        recording device security information, and/or recording device        watermark-checking capabilities, etc. Functions can also allow        reading from media, writing to media, formatting media, testing        media, and/or ejecting media, etc. Additional functions can        provide access to cryptographic functions or other special        capabilities supported by particular media formats.    -   Requested User Operation: For example, play, record, translate        to new format, load to portable device, make first copy, make        multiple copies, and/or simultaneous play/record, etc. The        content can also be given the ability to initiate or modify        requested operations.    -   Output Information: Information about output ports, output port        configurations, output port security characteristics, connected        devices, output data format, and/or output data        quality/resolution, etc. If supported, content can directly        query output devices, to obtain additional information about the        device, and/or request cryptographic operations, etc. The player        can also allow the content to modify these parameters, for        example to specify reduced-quality output if security is poor.    -   Environment: Identities/hashes/versions of other running        programs and device drivers on the platform; contents or hashes        of memory; versions of installed attack detection modules;        results of system scans for attacks, and/or status of tamper        detectors, etc. These functions can also allow the content to        modify memory, e.g. to correct security weaknesses in other        programs.    -   Time: Date, time, time zone, elapsed clock cycle count, time        since last reset, time since manufacture, time since last        security upgrade, time since last battery change, and/or        estimated battery life remaining, etc.    -   Connectivity: Determine player communication capabilities, check        current connection status, establish network connections,        establish modem connections, specify criticality of establishing        network connections, check/specify connection security        characteristics, transmit data, receive data, close connections,        and/or idle connections, etc.    -   User Interface: Display user messages, display lyrics, display        graphics images, print graphics images, display        advertising/promotional messages, identify available user        interface controls, obtain user input, play speech to the user        using a player's speech synthesizer, and/or error reporting,        etc.    -   Watermark Control: Select content regions to output, select        external watermarking algorithms, control external watermark        detectors, and/or check mark detector status, etc.    -   Other: Player/playback status information, pay-per-play billing        control (e.g., player-based funding sources), error handling,        playback termination, secure nonvolatile memory support (see        below), apply player firmware update, and/or invoke external        modules (such as dynamically linked libraries), etc.

Some standardization of functions and parameters is useful to ensureinteroperability between implementations (e.g., so that content canfunction effectively in player environments designed after the contentwas originally published) and to simplify the task of authoring securecontent. Standardization is particularly helpful for functions where avariety of different manufacturers' products should provide the sametypes of information or operations. For example, a function and responsecodes to allow the content to determine the player form factor (homeaudio/video, portable, automotive, personal computer software-only,personal computer software with hardware assistance, professionalstudio, movie theater, etc.) can be standardized. Standardization hasthe additional benefit of preventing manufacturers from trying to avoidsecurity controls by reporting pertinent risk-related information innonstandard formats that pre-existing content cannot understand.

Of course, the system may also be configured to allow for manufacturersto add additional proprietary functions for use by content producers whochoose to use them. The ability to add new functions is particularlyvaluable for manufacturers who wish to add new features to theirproducts, since they can add these features, then establish co-operativebusiness relationships with content publishers to support the features.Such an embodiment can be extended easily while (if desired) maintainingbackward compatibility.

Manufacturers are responsible for providing accurate information to thecontent. While the content generally cannot directly verify the accuracyof much of the information it receives, this is not strictly necessarywhere manufacturers have strong incentives to ensure that thisinformation is correct. For example, publishers could prevent theirfuture content from playing on products made by dishonest manufacturers.

Although it can be beneficial if players provide cryptographicauthentication of information they provide to the content (e.g., byincluding digital signatures issued using certified player ormanufacturer keys), such authentication is not mandatory for most data.For output devices (such as digital speakers requesting high-qualitydigital audio data) or other portions of the system that connect viapotentially untrusted interfaces, cryptographic authentication is moreimportant so that malicious devices that impersonate trustworthy devicescan be detected and avoided.

Cryptogaphic Processing

In addition to providing information describing the playbackenvironment, an exemplary player also implements cryptographicoperations that can be invoked by the content. These operations canbehave like cryptographic oracles, allowing the content to supply aninput datum (for example, a 64-bit plaintext block) and returning theresult of a cryptographic computation. In an exemplary embodiment, theinputs to the cryptographic computation include at least a key (whosevalue is normally unknown and inaccessible to the content) and thecontent-specified input datum.

The following are (without limitation) examples of cryptographicprimitives that can be provided to the content for uses including(without limitation) authenticating the playback environment, derivingcontent decryption keys, etc.:

-   -   Block cipher oracles: The oracle encrypts (or decrypts) an input        message using a secret key, producing a ciphertext (or        plaintext) result.    -   Hash function oracles: The input message is hashed, typically        with a secret key (for example using an algorithm such as        HMAC-SHA), to produce the result.    -   Digital signature oracles: The input message is digitally signed        using the secret (private) key to produce the result. The        function can also provide the public key and its certificate(s)        to the content.    -   Random number generators: Random number generators can provide        the content with unpredictable information, for example to use        in preventing replay attacks in on-line connections.    -   Mathematical functions: Basic mathematical operations can be        provided to help the content optimize its computation processes.        For example, optimized modular multiplication or exponentiation        functions can be used by the content to perform the RSA        algorithm of U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829 to Rivest et al. to produce        and verify digital signatures and to encrypt and decrypt        messages.    -   Optimized cryptographic primitives: Optimized implementations of        standard cryptographic algorithms can help improve performance.        These operations can be used to help decrypt or hash blocks of        data, including without limitation regions of the interpreter        code space or sectors of content loaded from media.    -   Decryption control: If the content decides that playback is        authorized, the interpreter code can initialize the content        decryption module with the correct decryption key for each        segment of content. In addition, the interpreter code can        specify portions of the content that should be rendered or        skipped (e.g., to allow real-time watermark insertion during        playback). To ensure synchronization between the interpreter and        content streaming from media, key changes (or skipped regions)        can be specified in advance then triggered by signals in the        content. For example, am exemplary embodiment could allow the        content to specify a 64-bit value that triggers a key change        when encountered in the ciphertext, the number of ciphertext        bytes to skip following a key change, and the new key value to        use.    -   Key management: These functions allow the content to determine        which keys are known to the player.

In an exemplary embodiment for cryptographic oracles whose operations donot incorporate random parameters or other such variable data, thesystem can be configured so that expected result for a particular inputcan be computed in advance (e.g., when the content is mastered). Thepublisher can thus program the content to submit a chosen input to theoracle, then verify that the expected result is obtained. Maliciousplayers that lack authorized cryptographic keys will be unable tocompute the correct oracle response. Because the number of possibleoracle inputs is enormous (e.g., 2¹²⁸ for an oracle using a block cipherwith a block size of 128 bits), it is not practically feasible for anattacker to precompute or store the results to all possible queries.

In addition to validating valid players, cryptographic oracles can alsobe used to identify invalid players. For example, if keys extracted froma legitimate player are being used for unauthorized purposes, contentcan be mastered so that it will refuse to play on players that containthe revoked oracles. Because content will not play without valid keys,unauthorized players must include stolen keys. However, by using thesestolen keys, unauthorized devices reveal their status to new contentthat is aware of the compromise.

A wide variety of methods can be employed for incorporating oracleresults or checking whether a particular oracle query response is valid.The simplest is to simply perform a comparison against an expectedvalue. Because this can (at least in theory) be circumvented by amaliciously-designed interpreter that behaves as though all comparisonsmatch, content can include “dummy” comparisons that are expected to failor other such tests designed to thwart malicious interpreters. Theoracle itself can also be used to decrypt code or influenceself-modifying code. For example, the input to the oracle can be anencrypted version of the desired code. Depending on their configuration,such oracles thus allow content publishers to include on media code thatcan only be decrypted by authorized players or a subset of players,thereby helping to keep the content's code away from potentialattackers. Another way to use oracles is to use their outputs ascryptographic keys or to derive keys. These keys can then, for example,be used to decrypt code, content, other keys, or any other data. Thisflexible decryption capability can be used to implement a wide varietyof protocols and policies in content. For example, if players have anadequate assortment of keys, content can be programmed to use schemessuch as the method of Fiat and Naor (see A. Fiat and M. Naor, “BroadcastEncryption,” Advances in Cryptology, Douglas Stinson, editor, p. 480;Springer Verlag, 1993). Even sophisticated access control systems, suchas those described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,982,891 to Ginter et al. can beimplemented if desired (provided, of course, that the player providesthe necessary user interface, network, data storage, and cryptographicfunctions).

For mastering content, publishers may benefit from having access tooracle input/output pairs. In the case where the oracle uses a privatekey for an asymmetric cryptosystem such as RSA, the publisher simplyobtains the public key and uses it to perform the inverse of the oracleoperation. For a symmetric oracle constructed using block cipher, playermanufacturers can compute for publishers inverses of the symmetricoracles provided in each player. For example, if the player oracle usesa block cipher to decrypt 256-bit data blocks under a secret key, themanufacturer can provide publishers with access to the correspondingencryption function. Because access to the inverse-oracle does not allowthe oracle to be compromised, manufacturers could (for example) providethe inverse-oracle computation via a publicly-accessible web serverusing SSL. Manufacturers could also provide publishers with outputs fromrandomly-selected oracle inputs. (Although manufacturers could providepublishes with actual oracle functions as implemented in players, thesefunctions could potentially be misused to construct unauthorized playersthat emulate of legitimate ones.)

The specific methods used to assign keys to players and manufacturersdepends on the specific embodiment and security objectives. For example,in one exemplary embodiment, players are assigned a variety of symmetriccryptographic oracle keys, including (without limitation): playersymmetric keys chosen (pseudo)randomly from a larger global pool of suchkeys; player-specific symmetric keys generated (pseudo)randomly by themanufacturer; symmetric keys unique to the manufacturer, player model,etc.; and/or symmetric keys authenticating that the player does not haveparticular characteristics (e.g., was not produced by particularmanufacturers). In this exemplary embodiment, the content can identifywhich keys are implemented in the player by calling a separate functionthat returns a list of the supported keys. Players can also containasymmetric keys. For example, in the exemplary embodiment, players havea player-specific public/private keypair; a player certificate issued bythe manufacturer by signing the player public key using themanufacturer's private key; a certificate issued by a root key issuingauthority validating the manufacturer's public key; a public key used tovalidate requests to access the player's secure memory areas (seebelow); and/or a public key used to validate player firmware updates.

In infrastructures involving multiple player manufacturers, it may behelpful to have one or more central administrative organizations managekeys for players, manufacturers, etc. Central administrators can also behelpful for enforcing minimum security standards, ensuring that playersprovide accurate information to content code, reserving keys for newmanufacturers (so that that their products will be able to play oldcontent), tracking compromised keys, performing cryptographic oracleoperations for content publishers, etc.

Secure Memories and Counters

The memory available to content is typically volatile, providing contentwith a “clean” execution environment each time it is run. For somefeatures, however, it is useful for content to be able to store databetween playings and between titles. To satisfy this need, players canprovide content with secure, nonvolatile storage for maintaining statebetween playings. Such storage can require additional securityprotections to ensure that only authorized interpreted code is able toread or modify the nonvolatile memory contents. Ensuring the security ofnonvolatile memory is important for publishers so that, for example,this memory can be trusted to track offline pay-per-view viewinghistories for later billing. It is not adequate to simply have a key onthe media for unlocking each memory slot, since this key would soon bediscovered by pirates, compromising the memory slots of all players.Thus, one embodiment provides for explicit cryptographic authenticationof the code that accesses these secure nonvolatile memory regions.

In this embodiment, players contain several blocks of nonvolatilememory, which are locked (i.e., read and write permissions are denied)by default. The player also contains a public key used to authenticaterequests to unlock memory blocks. To gain access to this memory block,the content calls a function that takes as input a digital signatureover the block of code that is authorized to access the memory. Thissignature is verifiable using the public key embedded in the player andspecifies the memory block to unlock and the access privilegesauthorized (arbitrary read, arbitrary write, increment, decrement,zeroize, etc.) within each portion of the block. The interpreterverifies the digital signature and, if the signature is valid, unlocksthe memory and executes the digitally-signed code. The following showsan example of this process for use in billing for off-line pay-per-usecontent with occasional (e.g., monthly) auditing:

-   -   (a) Publisher X negotiates with player manufacturer Y rights to        control a 4-byte counter in the nonvolatile memory of        manufacturer Y's players.    -   (b) Publisher X writes a function for the interpreter that        checks the memory contents. If the value is below a spending        limit, the function increments the counter. Otherwise, the        function establishes an Internet connection with the publisher,        transmits a payment request including the counter value, a        random number, and payment information (such as a credit card        number or other funding source stored in the player). If the        publisher accepts payment for the past purchases indicated by        the counter plus the current purchase, the publisher transmits        to the player a cryptographic authorization to clear the        counter, which the player verifies and (if valid) zeroes the        counter. The player concludes by relocking the memory and        returning a code indicating success or failure.    -   (c) Manufacturer Y digitally signs the memory-update code with        parameters identifying Publisher X's memory regions, access        privileges, etc.    -   (d) Publisher X produces content including the signed code and        distributes it to a user.    -   (e) The user's player begins loading the content, which presents        the user with a purchase option. If the user declines to        purchase, playback does not proceed.    -   (f) The content calls the memory unlock function with pointers        to the code written at step (b), and the digital signature        produced at step (c).    -   (g) The memory unlock function attempts to perform the purchase        as described in step (b) and reports success or failure.    -   (h) If the purchase was successful, the content plays for the        user. Otherwise, playback terminates.

Of course, much more sophisticated purchase mechanisms can be employedusing the secure counter mechanism described above. The only real limitson what can be implemented in the content come from the player'scapabilities and the publisher's creativity.

Various storage technologies can be employed with the systems andtechniques disclosed herein, including without limitation, flash memory,magnetic storage (e.g., hard disks), battery-backed RAM, etc. (A widevariety of methods are known in the background art for providingnonvolatile storage and for encrypting or otherwise securing suchstorage.) Secure storage can (without limitation) be located outside ofthe player, including without limitation in a removable module (such asa smart card), in attached output peripherals (such as speakers,displays, remote devices in a home network, etc.), remotely over acomputer network, etc. Memory block assignment can be provided, forexample, on a space-available basis, guaranteed (e.g., by slot number),or allocated/recycled based on priority. Because the clearing or freeingof memory slots could result in the loss of unreported pay-per-viewrecords, content can be given the ability to specify the conditionsunder which slots can be over-written. For players that can playmultiple titles simultaneously but that have only one set nonvolatilememory slots, a locking mechanism may be required to ensure that onepiece of content will access a slot that is being modified by anotherpiece of content.

In one embodiment, a pre-paid smart card is purchased by a consumer andinserted into a slot on the player. The card contains a plurality ofwrite-once memory slots into which the player can write identifierscorresponding to pay-per-view content titles. Once written, the contentidentifiers are incorporated into cryptographic oracle computationsimplemented in the card. Thus, content can verify that a purchase hasbeen consummated by verifying that the correct oracle is present beforeallowing playback.

Note that the general approach described above for authenticating callsto player functions is not limited to use with secure counters. Forexample, the same approach can be used to secure access to specialplayer features only available to authorized publishers. The approachalso has applicability separate from other aspects of the techniques andsystems disclosed herein, as it provides a general-purpose but extremelyflexible method for securing access to computation functions.

Cryptographic vs. Language Based Security Features

Security policies can be enforced in several different ways.Cryptographic protections allow the construction of content such thatrevoked or unauthorized players will lack the cryptographic keysnecessary to decrypt the content. Unauthorized players cannot accesscontent which they lack keys (provided, of course, that good ciphers areused). This approach is relatively inflexible since it provides thecontent owner with only the ability to block playback on a particulardevice. (While a more sophisticated embodiment could use different keysets to offer somewhat more detailed control, key-based controls lackthe flexibility required to solve more complex access controlchallenges.) Nevertheless, it is extremely effective at addressing thecase where a particular player is compromised or otherwise deemeduntrustworthy to have the ability to decrypt the content.

In contrast, language-based controls are less effective in the casewhere a player is compromised (or totally untrusted for some otherreason), but can enforce extremely sophisticated security policies. Asnoted previously, the content can analyze the playback environment andcall to cryptographic oracles and, if the results are deemedunsatisfactory, refuse to play. This approach provides virtuallyunlimited flexibility, making it ideally suited to managing risksinvolved in playback on players that generally behave honestly but maysupport operations (such as ripping to unprotected formats) that somepublishers may wish to prevent on certain content. Although attackerscould, at least in theory, analyze and break individual pieces ofcontent (particularly if the content's code is poorly-written), theseattacks cannot be generalized and can be reliably addressed throughcareful use of the cryptographic oracles. Furthermore, the decryptioncontrol capabilities described herein enable publishers who observepirated copies of their content to identify the compromised device andproduce new content that it is not vulnerable.

Evolution

It is desirable to provide content owners with a distributioninfrastructure that remains secure over the long term. Previous contentprotection systems have failed terribly in this regard; whileimplementers may initially be diligent about security as they woocontent owners to a new format, security levels tend to fallsignificantly once a format's success is ensured. A variety of factorscontribute to this decline, including: availability of moreimplementations to attack (increasing the likelihood that aneasily-broken product will be sold), increased demand for piracy as moreprotected content becomes available, and increased sophistication ofattackers. Exemplary embodiments of the systems and techniques disclosedherein can be configured to allow content owners to continue to specifyhow their content will be protected even after a media format has beenstandardized, while allowing virtually unlimited renewability so thatsecurity is not lost forever if an attack is found.

If security policies are not static, manufacturers have an ongoinglong-term incentive to provide effective security. For example, contentowners can have the ability to block playback (or prevent high-qualityplayback) on devices whose keys are compromised or on products that arecommonly used for piracy. As a result, unlike traditional systems,product manufacturers cannot sacrifice security as they compete to offertheir products at the lowest possible price, since consumers will alsoseek out products that have robust security because these will offer thebest and most reliable playback experience.

Even a well-intentioned manufacturer may accidentally produce a productthat is later found to have security flaws. Accordingly, we disclose avariety of methods that can be used to respond to compromises andsecurity weaknesses. For example, player cryptographic keys and softwarecan be updated using digitally-signed code or key updates. These updatescan be delivered to the player on media containing software thatperforms the key update. For example, if a legitimate user's player endsup being revoked because a previous owner compromised its security, thenew owner can call the product's technical support line and obtain newkeys. (Of course, the customer service personnel may wish to obtain someuser information such as name, address, credit card number, telephonenumber, e-mail address, IP address, etc. to discourage pirates fromcalling to request new keys for unauthorized purposes.) Updates can alsobe distributed via the Internet (or other network connections), modemcalls, entry via the remote control or keyboard, etc. Of course, updatesshould be cryptographically secured whenever possible so that attackerscannot use the update process to inject compromised keys or otherwiseattack a player.

Another way that manufacturers can reduce the consequences of acompromise is to include a removable security module, such as a smartcard. The smart card would implement some or all of the cryptographicoracles as well as other security-related functions provided to thecontent. If a compromise does occur or if a security flaws is found, itis possible to replace the smart card instead of replacing or upgradingthe entire player. Note that it may be sufficient to simply provide asmart card slot, but not deploy smart cards until such time as itbecomes necessary for security reasons. To prevent smart cards frombeing removed from legitimate players and used in malicious ones, thesmart card can be cryptographically linked to the receiver (e.g., byhaving them share a symmetric key) before the player and/or card aresent to the consumer.

Mastering & DRMs

Any new costs involved in mastering content are a legitimate concern forcontent owners. The techniques and systems disclosed herein can bedeployed so as to avoid significant new costs to the mastering process,if simple security measures are employed. While developing content thatenforces complex security policies obviously requires more developmentand testing effort, this expenditure is entirely optional. (Otherprotection systems simply eliminate this choice, forcing all contentpublishers to use the same security systems, policies, etc.)

Of course, publishers do not need to develop security systems themselvessince the systems and techniques disclosed herein also permit thirdparty DRM vendors to provide security modules and mastering systems.These vendors would compete for publishers' business by offering thebest features, best security, lowest cost, greatest flexibility, bestease of use, best performance, smallest code size, most extensiverevocation lists, etc. The techniques and systems disclosed herein canserve as a platform where content owners have the ability to make theirown decisions about security.

Watermarking & Compromise Tracing

With most conventional watermarking methods, the mark detection processis standardized and implemented in a large number of widely deployedproducts. This static algorithm unfortunately poses a serious risk,since knowledge of the detection algorithm generally allows attackers toremove the watermark without seriously degrading the content. In anexemplary embodiment, the systems and techniques disclosed herein mayinclude on-the-fly watermark insertion that is not susceptible to ageneral mark removal attack because the mark format, encoding process,and detection process are all chosen by the publisher.

In one exemplary embodiment, a publisher (or, more precisely, a controlprogram written by the publisher) wishes to embed some information insome output content. Each bit of this information can be encoded bydecrypting and outputting either a first content portion or a secondportion. These portions can be different encrypted regions on the mediaand can be encrypted with different keys. The differences between theseportions can be chosen by the publisher when the content is mastered,and can be anything from imperceptibly-subtle variations to totaldissimilarity. Because there is no predetermined relationship betweenthe two portions, there is no way for a pirate who knows only oneportion (including the decryption key for that portion) to determine theother.

Because cryptographic and program-based controls can be used to selectwhich regions are decrypted, attackers cannot determine what thealternate region(s) contain. Indeed, content can be designed so thatattackers cannot even identify whether alternate regions are present,for example by encrypting the control code (so that different playersuse different code) and by including dummy regions that no players oronly a very small number of players can decrypt.

In one exemplary embodiment, content is authored so that only a subsetof all players have the keys necessary to decrypt each version of aregion of the content, yet substantially all players have the keysnecessary to decrypt at least one version of the region. Thus, byanalyzing an unauthorized copy of this region, the publisher candetermine information about the attacker. Note that this is true even inthe case where attackers manage to analyze a (vulnerable) program anddecrypt more than one alternate region, since the resulting combinationof several regions still reveals to the publisher which versions weredecrypted. Ultimately, the only way reliable way that users can avoidrevealing their identity (or their player's identity) to publishers'anti-piracy enforcement experts is to refrain from participating inpiracy in the first place.

This general marking approach is different from conventionalwatermarking because the mark detection process need not bestandardized. This difference allows vastly greater security; indeed, itcan be shown that there is no general attack against this markingscheme. Furthermore, because the watermarked bits produce differences inthe output, these watermarks can be extremely robust and can be designedsurvive digital/analog conversions, editing, format conversions,malicious attacks, etc.

The decision of how to configure and use the content marking capabilityis typically made by the publisher. Some artists may wish to avoid toany technology that could make any modification, however small,precluding the use of the watermarking feature on their work. In othercases, certain types of content are pirated widely and are goodcandidates for very aggressive use of marking capabilities. Whileportions would normally be chosen to have only imperceptibledifferences, the choice of what alternate versions to encode, how toselect between possible output versions, and the management of thedecryption keys for these portions is controlled by the content. Becausethe marking capability is controlled by data processing instructionsintegrated with the content, the technology can be used for otherfeatures including, without limitation, implementing a sweepstakes wherewinners' players output a congratulatory message, delivering of securityalerts to users whose players offer inadequate security, and providingbonus content to certain users.

Of course, other watermarking schemes can also be used with thetechniques and systems disclosed herein. For example, traditionalwatermarks (for which the mark detection algorithm is standardized) canbe embedded in output as well, either by the content's code or byexternal watermark embedding circuitry (which may or may not be underthe control of the content). Similarly, watermarks in incoming contentcan be sensed (again, either by the content's code or by externaldetectors), for example to detect attempts to make unauthorized copiesor introduce unauthorized content. The choice of what watermarks toembed and how to respond to detected watermarks can be implemented inthe player and/or in the content.

Example Migration Path: CD-Audio

The vast majority of digital content is distributed today in unprotectedor minimally-protected formats. For example, the CD audio standardscontain no anti-copying features, and the protection scheme in DVD videohas been widely broken. Because legacy media players do not supportadequate security, they need to be upgraded or replaced. The success ofa new security system depends on establishing a critical mass ofcompatible players.

By combining the techniques and systems disclosed herein with existingmethods for producing copy protected CDs, it is possible to produce CDsthat are backward compatible. Such CDs would utilize non-standard CDformatting to produce discs that play correctly on most audio CD playersbut confuse computer-based ripping software. Authorized (e.g., licensed)personal computer software can also play the disc by correcting theportions that are read incorrectly or otherwise confuse the computer.Thus, playback is enabled on (most) legacy audio players because theycan play the non-standard (copy protected) Red Book audio portion, andplayback is enabled on personal computers that have appropriate playersoftware (which can, for example, be included on the CD or can bedownloaded over the Internet). Although long-term support forbackward-compatibility with existing CD audio players can introduceadditional security risks, it can be beneficial as part of a longer-termstrategy to encourage the deployment of audio players that can play thenew secure format so that (eventually) content can be sold in only thesecure format.

Example: High-Definition DVD

The copy protection system employed by current DVD video players hasbeen widely broken. Because millions of DVD players have already beensold and are not upgradeable to new protection systems, there is nostraightforward way to upgrade the current DVD format without abandoningsupport for these legacy users. Fortunately, the installed base of DVDplayers are only designed to support “standard” definition television(e.g., 525-lines for NTSC, 625 lines for PAL, etc.), but not the muchhigher-quality signals provided by high-definition television (HDTV)formats. Because legacy players do not support HDTV, the new securityfeatures disclosed herein can be incorporated on DVDs that support HDTV.

In one exemplary embodiment, the player would have a user-accessiblemedia input (consisting of a mechanized tray for one or more discs),which loads the media to a spindle where it is rotated and read using alaser. The data read from the media are brought to amicroprocessor-based circuit, which analyzes the disc encoding todetermine the capacity of the disc, formatting type, and securitymethod. If the disc is a legacy (low-resolution) DVD using the legacysecurity scheme (CSS), then the disc is played using methods known inthe background art. If the disc is a high-density DVD using programmablesecurity methods as disclosed herein, then program code (data processinginstructions) for the content's security policies are loaded from thedisc and executed by the player. Players can optionally also supportlow-density DVDs using the improved security, as well as high-densityDVDs using legacy protection methods (although using a widely-brokensecurity scheme for new content generally provides little benefit). Thequality of the output from the DVD player can be controlled by thecontent. For example, the content can elect to output lower-resolutionoutput if the player and/or HDTV output device do not provide adequatesecurity. In this case, the content can (for example and withoutlimitation) direct the player to down-convert HDTV signals to lowerresolution (for example, using a degradation module specificallydesigned for this purpose), supply the player with only the keysrequired to decrypt lower-resolution portions of the signal (andwithhold keys required for the higher-resolution portions), or directthe player to output a low-resolution, version of the content that isencoded on the media separately from the higher-resolution version.

Interpreter Architecture

In one exemplary embodiment, the interpreted language is based on theDLX assembly language. The basic DLX processor architecture is wellknown in the background art (e.g., see Computer Architecture: AQuantitative Approach by Hennessy et al., Second Edition). Codeexecuting within the interpreter's memory space (which, in one exemplaryembodiment, consists of 8 megabytes of RAM) is sandboxed such that itcan only access this memory and the processor's register set. Invalidinstructions (or other operations) may be treated as NOPs (i.e., donothing) or may trigger an exception. Similarly, out-of-bounds memoryaccesses may trigger an exception or may be corrected (e.g., in the caseof a 32-bit read from an 8 megabyte address space, by ANDing the addresswith hexadecimal 0x007FFFFC to wrap out-of-bounds accesses around to thebeginning of memory and to ensure 32-bit alignment).

The DLX “trap” instruction is used to provide access to externalprocedure calls. The “trap” instruction invokes operations in the playerthat may extend outside the sandbox (i.e., beyond the registers andmemory accessible to normal instructions). For descriptions of suchoperations, see the section “Querying and Controlling the PlaybackEnvironment”.

It is also possible for a dedicated hardware embodiment to use an ASICor FPGA (or other hardware) implementation of the DLX processor insteadof a software-based interpreter/emulator, in which case the “trap”instruction may (for example) be configured to trigger the processor toenter a higher privilege level, expand its address space to include aROM or EEPROM area (e.g., by enabling an additional address line), storethe return program counter, and jump to a predetermined address in theexpanded address space for further processing. The higher privilegelevel may also enable additional instructions or capabilities in theprocessor core, such as the ability to interact with externalperipherals (e.g., nonvolatile memory, cryptographic accelerators, keymanagement components, optical media drives, data networks, satellitereceivers, etc.) Memory protection capabilities in hardwareimplementations can include limiting the number of address lines(thereby preventing out-of-bounds accesses), or using other memoryprotection methods known in the background art. Upon completion of the“trap” call, the processor would reduce the privilege level and continueexecution of the content code.

In an exemplary DLX implementation for decrypting video distributed onhigh-density optical discs, a “trap” operation is provided to allow thecontent to read data from the disc. To load data from physical media,the content code typically specifies an address (e.g., a sector numberon an optical disc), the destination address for the data in DLX memoryspace, the amount of data to load, and optionally decoding parameters(such as error correction polynomials/parameters, decoding keys, etc.).The content may perform any manner of processing steps using the data,even including executing the data as code. Because optical drives, harddrives, and other data sources often have considerable latency(especially when performing operations such as seeking to a new track),separate “trap” operations may be used to pre-specify regions that areexpected to be needed, to request data, to check the status of pendingrequests, and/or to actually load data into the DLX memory space.

The content code can also invoke trap operations for performinghigh-speed cryptographic operations on memory. For example, an exemplarybulk decryption “trap” operation utilizes the AES encryption algorithmand allows the content to specify (a) an index selecting from among thesecret keys stored within (or accessible to) the player, (b) anencrypted key, (c) an address in the DLX memory space for the data todecrypt, and (d) the length of the data to decrypt. The trap (a) usesthe key identified by the index value to decrypt the encrypted keyreceived from the content, and (b) uses the decrypted key with the AESalgorithm in ECB mode to decrypt the specified number of data blocks atthe address indicated. The key-decrypting-keys that may be selected bythe index may include keys stored in the player (including withoutlimitation player-specific keys, manufacturer keys, group keys, mediakeys, etc. which may optionally be stored in internal tamper-resistantchips with cryptographic capabilities and internal nonvolatile memory),keys stored in external devices (including without limitationcryptographic modules, disc drives, remote network-accessibledevices/servers, displays, speakers, etc.). To determine what keys areavailable, the content code may analyze information such as the player'stype, the player's serial number, key lists/descriptions included withthe player (and optionally digitally-signed by the player manufactureror a trusted party), data obtained over a network, and any otheravailable data about the player or playback environment (see the section“Querying and Controlling the Playback Environment”). Any manner ofother cryptographic capabilities may also be provided by the content tothe player, including without limitation: encryption, decryption,symmetric algorithms (stream ciphers, block ciphers, hashing algorithms,message authentication codes, etc. with any modes of operation), publickey algorithms (signing, verification, encryption, decryption, keyagreement, zero knowledge operations, etc.), key and certificatemanagement, etc.

The content code may perform additional processing (or preprocessing)operations on the decryption result. For example, an XOR operation mightbe performed to convert an ECB decryption result into a CBC decryptionresult. Descrambling steps may be applied to prevent adversaries fromusing keys extracted from players to decrypt content without executingits interpreted code. Examples of steps that may be applied include,without limitation, toggling bits, making changes using simple binaryoperations, reordering blocks, fixing up or inserting offsets/addresses(e.g., to assemble a data stream that is complaint with MPEG-2 or othervideo compression standards), applying public key operations (such asmodular squaring or cubing modulo a composite number), applyingsymmetric cryptographic operations, and updating internal checksums.Post-processing steps can also be used to introduce or modify forensicwatermarks, e.g. to allow copies to be traced to a specific device.Decoded/processed data may also be executed using the interpreter,allowing portions of the decryption/playback code itself to bedistributed in encrypted form and enabling content to utilize a widevariety of code hiding and obfuscation techniques, such as the use ofself-modifying code. It is even possible to construct multi-functionaldata, e.g. data that performs a useful task when executed but alsorepresents valid compressed video.

When the processing is complete and data is ready to be output, thecontent code can invoke additional procedure calls (e.g., DLX “trap”operations) in the player for outputting data to the user. Such callsmay, for example, transfer data to one or more video decoders (e.g., anMPEG-2 decoder), audio decoders (e.g., an MP3 or AC-3 decoder), orgraphics overlay systems (e.g., with transparency/overlay capabilitiesand supporting still images and/or animation engines such as GL,ShockWave, or Flash). The data would be transformed (e.g., decompressed)if appropriate, then presented. Presentation may include transferringthe data to one or more physically-separate device, such as audiospeakers or video displays.

Embodiments with decryption and decompression/output as separate APIcalls have the advantage that they allow greater control by the content,but have the potential disadvantage of increasing the number of timesthat the content needs to be read from and written to memory. Inpractice, however, random access memory is usually sufficiently fastthat the additional latency is manageable even for very high bit-ratecontent such as theater-quality high-definition video. On high speedimplementations, player codecs may be unnecessary, as decompression maybe implemented in interpreted code. Players can also providesingle-instruction, multiple-data parallel processing capabilities(e.g., by offering single-instruction-multiple-data mathematicaloperations accessible via procedure calls, roughly similar to the MMX,SSE, and SSE2 instructions found on x86 processors) to improve theperformance of codecs, graphics processing operations, etc. implementedusing interpreted code.

A variety of interpreter implementations strategies are possible. In oneembodiment, an interpreter is implemented in software that runs on anormal microprocessor. In another embodiment, an interpreter isimplemented using reconfigurable logic, such as a field programmablegate array. In another embodiment, a dedicated hardware device performsthe role of the interpreter. In all three cases, procedure calls may beimplemented (without limitation) using any combination of nativesoftware, hardware acceleration, and calls to external devices orcomponents.

Native Code

In addition to interpreting player-independent, sandboxed code, theplayer may also allow the content to submit native code for executionand/or storage. Prior to accepting software or logic that may haveaccess to keys or other privileged resources, the player validates thecode. Validation may, for example, be performed by making sure that thecode includes a valid RSA digital signature issued by the playermanufacturer or another trustworthy party. Successfully-validated nativecode may be stored in volatile memory for execution by thecurrently-loaded content, or it may be stored in the player'snonvolatile memory where it can be available to other titles. Forexample, to avoid possible negative effects on other titles, a patch tocorrect a cosmetic quirk in the player or to provide a performanceoptimization might be stored in volatile memory for use only by thecurrently-loaded title. In contrast, an upgrade to correct a securityvulnerability would typically be stored permanently in the player'snonvolatile memory.

Native code is normally specific to a single player platform or playerapplication, making it less portable than interpreted code. Itsadvantage is that it can be used if needs arise that cannot be addressedusing interpreted code. For example, native code can be employed bycontent as a way to distinguish between legitimate players andunauthorized emulators or “clones”, avoiding the need to revoke everypotentially-affected device each time attackers find a major securityvulnerability in a product's design. As a defense against such attacks,product vendors can include built-in native-code capabilities orinterpreter operations that would be difficult to emulate or reverseengineer. Note that capabilities designed to help detect or respond toplayer-specific attacks can be vendor-proprietary and/orplayer-specific, since they would only be activated in response to aplayer-specific issue. Specific measures could include, withoutlimitation, simple undocumented features, timing-sensitive routines,operations that are explicitly designed to be difficult to reverseengineer or emulate at full speed in software (e.g., see thePseudoasymmetric Function of U.S. Pat. No. 6,289,455 to Kocher et al.which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety), and fullcryptographic oracles (symmetric or asymmetric). In the case of a devicewhere the interpreter is implemented in dedicated hardware, the “native”code and the interpreted code may be similar or identical (though theymay operate with different privileges, in which case players could limitexecution at the higher privilege level to specially-authenticatedcode).

In an exemplary embodiment of content employing native code, the mediaincludes an initial boot portion consisting of interpreted code which,when interpreted, loads additional interpretable code. The content code(e.g., the code loaded by the boot portion) would then issue procedurecalls to the player and analyze the results to determine informationabout the playback environment, including the player type. The contentmay also verify the playback environment, e.g. by requiring that theplayer (or other components) perform cryptographic operations using keysspecific to (or characteristic of) reported playback environmentcharacteristics. To deter malicious interpreters from tampering with thevalidation results, the result of such operations may be used insubsequent decoding and playback processes. (For example, byincorporating cryptographic results from the player in decryption keycomputations, content can robustly prevent playback on malicious playersthat claim a particular player type or playback environment attributebut lack the corresponding cryptographic keys. Results can also becompared with expected values, verified using public key schemes, etc.)The content then determines whether the player is of a type that, bydefault, includes a security defect (or other problem) that needscorrecting. In making this determination, the content code may analyzeinformation from within the player (e.g., data in nonvolatile memoryaccessible to the content, date/time information from a clock in theplayer, etc.) and/or information obtained externally (e.g., by queryingattached devices or communicating over a network). If a problem isidentified, a corresponding countermeasure is obtained (e.g., from themedia or over a data network such as the Internet). Depending on thenature of the issue, the countermeasure may involve interpreted codeand/or native code. In the case where a native code countermeasure isnecessary, the content can submit the countermeasure code asdigitally-signed data to the player, including instructions indicatingwhether the code should be buffered in volatile memory for future use(e.g., through a procedure call), stored permanently (e.g., to correct abug in existing nonvolatile memory), and/or executed immediately. Thenative code can also be configured to perform an identifiable operation(such as a cryptographic computation that can be integrated with contentdecryption processes) so that content code can be assured that thenative code was actually executed by the player. Native code can also beconfigured to disable malicious players, e.g. by overwritingcryptographic keys. The content may also query, analyze, and delivercode and code updates (native or interpreted) to other devices, such asdisplays or speakers connected via digital interfaces. Once the playbackenvironment is acceptable, the content code then proceeds with playbackas requested by the user, for example by loading chunks of data from themedia, performing decryption operations while inserting forensicwatermarks, and delivering the decrypted data for decompression andoutput.

Standardization and Performance Considerations

It is often necessary to have standards that define the playbackenvironment in sufficient detail that makers of compliant players can beconfident that their products will be able to play compliant content(subject to security policies, etc.). Such standards would typicallyspecify the interpreter's basic instruction set (or equivalent) andrequired procedure calls. It may also be necessary to define performancerequirements for any instructions and procedure calls that may beincluded in real-time portions of the decoding process. (Performancerequirements are generally less critical for operations that are onlyperformed during, start-up, shut-down, and other non-real-timeoperations.)

For example, an exemplary specification might require that compliantinterpreters be able to execute a minimum of 8 million “time units”(TUs) per second, where normal low-level interpreter operations may eachtake up to one TU and multiplication and division operations may take 4TUs each. Performance requirements for calls to player-suppliedprocedures (e.g., DLX “traps”) depend on the operation requested. Forexample, AES encryption operations may take up to 100 TUs plus 12 TUsper block cipher computation. Word-aligned memory copies may take up to50 TUs plus 1 TU per 16 bytes (or fraction thereof). Buffering a mediaread request, or checking the completion status of a buffered request,can take up to 100 TUs. Read requests are performed one at a time in theorder submitted but in parallel with other processing, and may take upto 10,000 TUs plus 1'500 TUs per 2048-byte sector. Non-sequential readsmay take an additional(20000+640000*seek_distance_in_sectors/max_sectors_per_media) TUs forseek overhead. Loading data from a completed read (i.e., transferringdata from the drive's buffer into the interpreter's memory space) cantake up to 100 TUs plus 128 TUs per 2048-byte sector transferred.Transferring data to codecs or other outputs can take up to 100 TUs plus1 TU per 16 bytes (of fraction thereof) transferred. Of course, thesetiming values are provided for exemplary purposes; the specificperformance metrics would depend on the system's requirements. Morecomplex performance mandates (e.g., that specify total computation timesfor instruction sequences) may also be specified to provide playerimplementers with greater flexibility or to provide content authors withbetter performance guarantees.

In practice, many implementations would operate considerably faster thanthe performance minimums. This simply means that the data will be readybefore it is required. For example, a software-based interpreter thattakes 40 clock cycles per regular interpreted instruction would performabout 50 million TUs/second on a 2 GHz microprocessor. Similarly, adedicated hardware implementation running at 25 MHz and running at 2clock cycles per instruction would also perform significantly more than8 million TUs per second.

Note that standards developers face a trade-off between simplicity ofthe system and the performance. In particular, for software-basedimplementations, operations performed in procedure calls can generallybe assumed to operate significantly faster than the same operations ininterpreted code. On the other hand, these operations must typically bedefined in advance and also typically include entry/exit overhead intheir performance assumptions. Nevertheless, procedure calls for commonoperations such as memory copying, searching, large-number arithmetic,and cryptographic computations can provide a significant performancebenefit. An alternative performance-enhancing approach is for theinterpreter to analyze the content code before or during execution toidentify regions that can be optimized (e.g., converted into nativecode). The content code can also include “hints” to notify theinterpreter of regions that are suitable candidates for optimization.The “hint” approach has the benefit that hardware implementations (whichtend to be fast, but have difficulty performing complex operations) canignore the hint (e.g., by treating it as a NOP) and process thesubsequent code normally. Software implementations (which tend to beslower, but have higher-speed native code capabilities) can use the hintto substitute interpreted code with functionally-compatible native coderoutines. If desired, performance standards can specify playerperformance requirements for common constructions. Players can alsoallow content to select between interpreter modes that are alwaysguaranteed to meet performance minimums (e.g., for real-time tasks) andmodes with better average-case performance (e.g., for non-real-timetasks).

When authoring content, content developers need to verify that thesoftware they have written meets the performance minimums specified bythe standard. A specialized test system for verifying timing compliancetabulates the worst-case performance characteristics of content code asit executes. It operates by emulating the playback process, whiletabulating the maximum allowable time a player could take for eachsuboperation performed. If the playback process is too slow (e.g., ifthe measured worst-case player performance lags behind timestamps in thedata being supplied to the codec or if the codec could become “starved”of data), the tool can notify the media author, who can then correct theproblem. Authoring tools may employ the same approach to ensure thattheir output will play reliably.

Securing Nonvolatile Memory

As described previously, a player device can provide content withnonvolatile (NV) storage capabilities for use by the content. Becausethe number of entities authoring content may be large (possiblyincluding small artists, students, home users, etc. as well as majorstudios), it may be advantageous for content and players to enforcelimitations on NV storage use under the assumption that some content maybe written poorly or even maliciously. As a result, players may wish tolimit the ability of each title to reserve NV memory and to read,modify, and over-write stored data. The section entitled “SecureMemories and Counters” describes using digital signatures to validatecode that accesses nonvolatile memory. In some situations, however, itmay be desirable (e.g., for political and/or technical reasons) for thenonvolatile memory security to operate without a centralizedcertification authority while still allowing content titles to allocateand/or control nonvolatile memory regions.

The following section describes an exemplary embodiment of a player thatprovides content with secure access to a nonvolatile memory withoutrequiring a centralized signing authority. Referring to FIG. 4, theexemplary memory manager controls access to 128 kilobytes of flashmemory, which is divided into 511 slots of 256 bytes each and 256 bytesfor additional data. Slot 0 [410], slot 1 [412], slot 2 [414], and eachslot thereafter 440 contains: a 128-bit creator media ID 420 identifyingthe media ID of the title that originally allocated the slot; a 128-bitlast update media ID 422 identifying the media ID of the title that mostrecently modified the slot; a 40-bit last update sequence counter 424identifying when the slot was most recently updated; an 8-bit slotpriority value 426 indicating the slot's rank if a slot needs to beoverwritten; 16 bytes of private data 428 that is only accessible byauthorized code; a 160-bit hash 430 of the code that is authorized toaccess the slot; and the main slot payload data 432. When a player isinitialized at the factory, these values may be all initialized to zeroto indicate that the slot is empty.

The final 256 bytes of the 128 kilobyte nonvolatile memory is used tostore values including: a secret player key 444; a counter containingthe number of priority 6 slots that have been overwritten 445; a countercontaining the number of priority 7 slots that have been overwritten446; and a slot write counter stored as a high portion 447 and a lowportion 448. Because the slot write counter is updated frequently andsome nonvolatile memory technologies wear out after too many writecycles, this counter is stored in a form that limits the number of timesthat any particular memory cell is updated. The counter is incrementedby setting a bit in the low portion 448 unless 1023 of the 1024 bits inthe low portion are full, in which case high portion 449 is incrementedand all 1024 bits of low portion 448 are cleared. The counter value isread by multiplying high portion 447 by 1024 then adding the number ofbits set in low portion 449. When a player is initialized at thefactory, these values may be all initialized to zero, except that theplayer key should be initialized with a secret (pseudo)random value.

The player also maintains several values which may be stored in volatilememory (e.g., conventional RAM). These include media key 450, mediaidentifier 452, a value indicating which slot (i.e., number 0 through510) is currently attached 456, and a value indicating the highestpriority slot in the NV memory written so far by the current title. Whena title is initialized (e.g., when media is inserted or the player isreset), attached slot identifier 454, attached slot priority 456, andmax create priority 458 are reset. Media key 450 is preferably loadedfrom a portion of the media that is not writable withconsumer-recordable devices on consumer-recordable media. Mediaidentifier 452 is then derived from the media key by applying a one-waycryptographic transformation, such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA-1),which is well known in the background art. To provide additionalassurance, the media may carry a cryptographic signature authenticatingmedia key 450 and/or media identifier 452, which can then beauthenticated by the player and/or content code. Alternate embodimentsmay include other values (such as the identity of the facility thatmanufactured or pressed the media and/or identifiers specific toparticular piece of media instead) and do not necessarily have to have afixed relationship between identifiers and keys.

In general, content code can be allowed largely unfettered read accessto nonvolatile memory contents, excluding the private data 428 of eachslot. This read access may be implemented using procedure call (e.g., aDLX “trap” operation) that allows the content to specify a slot numberand retrieve the contents. If the requested slot is not currentlyattached (i.e., identified by attached slot identifier 454), the slotprivate data 428 is not returned (e.g., zeroes are returned for theselocations).

In the exemplary embodiment, content is provided with the followingbasic operations for reading from, requesting access (“attaching”) to,and modifying nonvolatile memory slots:

ReadSlot: This procedure call reads the contents of a specified slotinto the memory space accessible by the content code. This procedure'sinput parameters include a slot number and a pointer within thecontent's memory where the results should be stored. The entire slotcontents are returned except for private data field 428, which isnormally zeroed in the read results. If specified slot number is (−1),the slot identified by attached slot identifier 454 is read and thecomplete contents (including private data 428) are retrieved and stored.The operation's return value is an integer containing either the slotnumber that was read (e.g., attached slot identifier 454 if slot (−1)was specified) or an error code indicating why the request failed.

AttachSlot: This procedure call is used to request privileged access toa specified slot. Prior to granting such access, the code making therequest is authenticated. The procedure's input parameters identify theslot number, the code length, and a requested priority level. Theprocedure determines the starting address of the code to be grantedaccess (e.g., the address in the content's memory following theinstruction invoking the AttachSlot operation). Using the address andthe specified length, the procedure then computes a cryptographic hash(e.g., using SHA-1) of the code. If the hash result does not match thevalue of the authorization hash 430 stored in the slot or if therequested priority is determined to be invalid (e.g., as described belowwith respect to FIG. 5), then slot-zero is attached (i.e., attached slotidentifier 454 and attached slot priority 456 are set to zero) and anerror is returned. Otherwise, the requested slot number becomes the slotthat is currently attached (i.e., attached slot identifier 454 is set tothe requested slot number, and attached slot priority 456 is set). As aspecial case, the calling code can specify a slot number of (−1) torequest that a new slot be allocated. In this case, the player validatesthe requested priority (e.g. as described below with respect to FIG. 5)and returns an error if the priority is invalid. Otherwise, the playerselects a slot to overwrite (as described below), clears it out (e.g.,by setting creator media ID 420 to the current media ID 452, zeroing theother slot fields, and incrementing write counter 447/448), attaches tothe slot (e.g., by setting attached slot identifier 454 to the slot'snumber and setting priority 456 to the requested priority), and sets maxcreate priority 458 to the larger its current value and requestedpriority 456. If the interpreter supports interrupts or othercapabilities that could cause the unexpected execution ofpotentially-untrusted code, these should be disabled to avoid theintroduction of malicious code while a slot is attached. The returnvalue is the attached slot number 454, or an error code if the operationfailed (e.g., because of a code hash mismatch or an invalid requestedpriority).

SlotWrite: This procedure call writes data to the currently-attachedslot. This procedure's input parameter points to the new contents forthe slot private data 428, the authentication hash 430, and the payload432, which are written along with updated values for other slot fields.(In particular, creator media ID 420 is left unchanged, last updatemedia ID 422 is set to the current media ID 452, last update sequencecounter 424 is set to slot write counter 447/448, and slot priority 426is set to attached slot priority 456.) Prior to the slot write, the slotwrite counter is incremented by updating its low part 448 and, ifnecessary, high part 447. Players using nonvolatile memory with alimited lifetime (e.g., many flash and EEPROM memories are rated at 1million write cycles) may reject writes if too many (e.g., more than128) writes have been performed since power up/media insertion. Thewrite operation resets attached slot identifier 454 and attached slotpriority 456 both to zero. The return value is a status code indicatingwhether the write was successful.

Slot priority management support is provided to balance severalpotentially-conflicting objectives, including: (a) content should haveaccess to as much nonvolatile memory as it might reasonably need; (b)content should have confidence that its nonvolatile memory will not beoverwritten unexpectedly; (c) one title should not be able to reserve anexcessive amount of nonvolatile memory and thereby preclude other titlesfrom being able to reserve any; (d) if no empty slots are available inthe nonvolatile memory, rarely-used slots should be recycled to providenew content with some nonvolatile storage; and (e) a title should not beable to submit large numbers of requests designed to cause legitimateslots to be recycled. In general, slots with higher priorities are lessprone to be overwritten if a player runs out of slots. In an exemplaryembodiment, priority rules are designed to ensure that each media titleis able to have at most one top priority slot (priority 7). In addition,media are only allowed to create one slot with priority of 2 or greateron each insertion or player power cycle. Content cannot create slotswith priorities higher than 7, although slots reserved when players aremanufactured can have higher priority levels.

FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary process for validating the whether therequested priority for an attached slot is acceptable. When a slot isattached or created (see SlotAttach above), the content specifies arequested priority value. At step 500, the player checks whether a newslot is being allocated (e.g., the slot number is specified as −1). Ifso, at step 510, the player checks whether the requested priorityexceeds the slot's existing priority 426 and, if so, returns an errorindicating that the requested priority is too large. Otherwise, at step520, the attachment request is allowed to proceed using the requestedpriority. If step 500 concludes that the request is to allocate a newslot, the player checks at step 530 whether the requested priority is 7or less and, if not, returns an error. Otherwise, at step 540, theplayer checks whether the requested priority exceeds 2 and, if not, therequested priority is accepted as valid for allocating a slot.Otherwise, at step 550, the player checks max create priority 458 todetermine whether any slots with priority larger than 2 have alreadybeen created since the media was inserted or the player was reset and,if so, the requested priority is rejected. Otherwise, at step 560, theplayer checks whether the requested priority is 7 and, if not, therequested priority is accepted as valid for allocating a slot.Otherwise, at step 570, the player checks whether there is already apriority 7 slot whose stored creator media ID 420 is equal to thecurrent media ID 452, and if so, rejects as invalid the requestedpriority. Otherwise, the requested priority is accepted for allocating aslot.

When a new slot is allocated (i.e., the content calls AttachSlot withslot −1), the player selects the slot with the lowest priority 426 foroverwriting. At the factory, empty slots are initialized with the lowestpossible priority (zero), and therefore will generally be used first. Ifmultiple slots share the lowest priority, then the slot with the lowestwrite sequence counter is selected. If a slot with priority 6 or 7 isselected for overwriting, the corresponding counter (priority 6overwrite count 445 or priority 7 overwrite count 446) is incremented.Alternatively, players with space for a very large numbers of slots maysimply fail if a request would require or otherwise involve overwritinga high-priority slot.

At the factory, some slots can be initialized with predetermined valuesfor the authentication hash 432 and a nonzero slot priority. Thefunctionality and/or security requirements for the slot depend on codethat is hashed. By way of example, the code used to formulate apredetermined authentication hash may be configured to perform thefollowing steps: (a) initialize all registers (e.g., stack pointers,etc.) to “safe” values; (b) load an RSA signature value from apredetermined address outside of the authenticated code area; (c) usinga public key embedded in the region authenticated by the AttachSlotoperation, determine whether the RSA signature is a valid signature overa region of the interpreter's memory; and (d) detach from the currentslot (e.g., by attaching to generally-accessible slot 0) if the RSAsignature is invalid, but otherwise jump to the first address of theregion that was digitally signed. If the digitally-signed code is onlyintended to be played on a specific player, the code may, for example,be configured to check the identity (or other attributes) of the playerand/or use player keys to decrypt a portion of the code before runningit.

The example in the preceding paragraphs illustrates a method forimplementing asymmetric signature validation (e.g., as described in thesection entitled “Secure Memories and Counters”) using a hash-based slotvalidation scheme. This approach allows slots to be reserved for futureuse, where the future use does not need to be specified when players aremanufactured or standards are defined. It is also possible to use apublic-key based code validation system to sign code that implements ahash-based approach.

It is possible to use a single slot for multiple purposes. For example,multiple code segments can be digitally-signed to pass a verificationprocess such as the one described above. Each of these code segments canbe configured to modify a different portion of the slot and properlydetach when completed.

Private data field 428 of the slot is also noteworthy, since it makes itpossible for code to encrypt slot contents. Although any content canread the main slot payload, only code that has been authorized (e.g.,using the SlotAttach process) can read private data 428. Authorized codecan therefore use private data 428 as a key (or to derive a key) toencrypt and decrypt slot contents. In this way, the privacy of datastored in slots can be assured. If desired, content also has the abilityto place authentication codes or digital signatures on slot contents.Such signatures can be generated by the content code (optionally usingplayer keys), can be generated by the player, or can be generated by anexternal party or device (such as the publisher of a title or the playermanufacturer). Subsequent titles can then be configured to searchthrough all slots, searching for a digitally-signed (or otherwiseauthenticated) values indicating (for example) that certain securitychecks are necessary or a particular media ID has been revoked.

Slot-based features can be shared by multiple titles. For example, it ispossible to implement a date manager which provides content with thelatest known date. Each title that uses this capability would carry adigitally-signed representation of the current date when it was masteredand some predetermined code matching the slot's authentication hash 430.The code for managing the slot would (a) check a digital signature onthe date carried with the content and, if invalid, detach from the slotand stop; (b) read the current slot contents; (c) compare thenow-verified date from the title with the date in the slot's payload432; (d) if the title's date is later, place the title's date in theslot contents and call SlotWrite to store the new date in thenonvolatile memory while leaving the rest of the slot unchanged; (e)detach from the slot, and (f) erase from RAM the slot private data (aswell as any other non-essential values). The operation would returneither an error or the later date value (i.e., the later of theauthenticated date carried with the title and the date previously storedin the slot). The code can optionally store the digital signature withthe date so that corrupted dates will not be misinterpreted as being farin the future. In addition, the date can also be stored encrypted (e.g.,using the value of private data field 428 as a key) to limit read accessto the stored date value to titles that include a current date. Datevalues in the player may, for example, be used by content to determinewhether security updates are needed, whether on-line security checks aredue, whether pay-per-view purchase records are due to be submitted, etc.

In some embodiments (e.g., those providing real-time networkcapabilities), it may be advantageous to have the player limit access tononvolatile memory when network support is enabled. This limitation canhelp assure users' privacy, for example by preventing malicious contentfrom extracting data from the nonvolatile storage and transmitting itover a network. As a specific example, titles that use network accesscapabilities may be prevented from reading data from slots (or fromreading certain slots, such as those that might contain user-identifyinginformation or were created by other titles). Players may also allowtitles to terminate their network access privileges and obtain broaderslot access (e.g., to obtain values for forensic watermarks once networkaccess is no longer required). Note that information embedded inforensic watermarks does not raise the same privacy concerns, since thisdata can only be recovered from copies of the content.

The specific nonvolatile memory management descriptions above areintended to illustrate particular embodiments. Many variations are, ofcourse, possible. For example, the specific slot configuration, slotmanagement operations, and priority management approaches are providedfor illustrative purposes. Rather than allocating memory in slots offixed size, other memory management approaches may be employed(including using allocation methods that are not based on slots). Otheraccess control mechanisms (such as those that are not based on mediaidentifiers) may also be employed. The total amount of nonvolatilememory for slots may be variable (or effectively unlimited, as in thecase of hard disks or other high-capacity storage technologies).Separate nonvolatile storage capabilities may be included for trackingmedia/disc insertion histories. It may be advantageous to usecryptography to encrypt and/or authenticate the contents of nonvolatilememory (or other memories, such as the memory accessible by the content)to prevent unauthorized reading/modification. In softwareimplementations, a variety of code, address, data, and algorithmobfuscation techniques may be employed to prevent extraction of (ortampering with) player keys. Any manner of data may also be stored inslots, including, without limitation: pay-per-view purchase records;counters of any kind (e.g., purchase counters, credit/debit or otherbalance counters, failure counters, media/disc insertion counters,etc.); results of on-line or telephone-based security checks; viewingrecords/histories; code (interpretable or native); revocation data (forplayers, peripherals, etc.); signals to other titles; information usedto evaluate qualification for rebates or discounts; transaction andplayback history data; digital signatures; and keys.

Media Revocation

One noteworthy scenario is the situation where a player is trustworthy,but the media has been pirated. This is a typical situation forprofessional pirates, since they will generally seek to provide a“product” that is as close as possible to legitimate copies. Alloff-line media playback devices are potentially susceptible attacks ofthis nature if pirates develop methods for producing copies oflegitimate media that players cannot physically distinguish from theoriginals. Hard-to-copy media features (such as measurements of wobblecharacteristics of tracks on optical discs) may be employed to makeexact duplication more difficult, but sufficiently determined piratesmay still find ways to make copies. Similarly, forensic watermarkingallows content owners to identify (among other things) equipment used topirate previous content, but does not prevent pirated content from beingplayed.

To address the risk of pirates producing unauthorized copies of media,content owners can place a unique per-copy identifier on legitimatemedia. For optical discs, this data can be placed in a region that canbe uniquely written in at the factory (such as the burst cutting areafound on some existing stamped optical discs) or on recordable discportions (e.g., utilizing storage technologies such those currently usedto make recordable CDs and DVDs, magnetic discs, etc.). Theuniquely-writable region only needs to carry a small amount ofinformation (e.g., a few bytes to a few hundred bytes). In particular,this area can carry recorded serial numbers, user information (name,telephone number, etc.), cryptographic keys, etc. as well as digitalsignatures authenticating these values. For consumer-recordable media, aunique media serial number (and optionally an associated digitalcertificate) can be recorded for each piece of blank media that ismanufactured.

The content code on media can be configured so that when media isinserted for playback, the authenticity of its unique data is verified.Depending on the media type and the data recorded, this verificationprocess would typically include verifying a digital signature that isunique to the piece of media. To prevent adversaries from bypassing thisverification check, verification can be performed using obfuscated code,checks can be performed multiple times (e.g., at various times duringplayback), and verification results can be integrated with subsequentdecryption processes. If the unique data is invalid, the content codewould typically reject playback. Otherwise, the content code gainsconfidence that either (a) the media is legitimate or (b) it was copiedfrom a piece of legitimate media that had the unique data provided.

Next, to determine whether the unique media is valid or revoked, thecontent checks the player's nonvolatile memory area for data fieldsindicating the revocation status of the currently-inserted media. If nomatching revocation information is found, the media is assumed to bevalid. To prevent inadvertent or malicious revocation, revocation datacan be authenticated by checking digital signatures or otherauthenticating data (such as a pre-image to a cryptographic hash). Thedata in the player's nonvolatile memory can also indicate what action,if any, is recommended, such as (a) notifying the user that the copy isillegal, (b) allowing playback to proceed at reduced resolution, (c)preventing playback altogether, or (d) allowing the user to legitimatelypurchase the content (e.g., by calling a telephone number and enteringan unlock code, or by interacting with a server over the Internet). Thenonvolatile memory can also over-ride previous revocation messages, e.g.so that content can be “unrevoked” if desired. If multiple conflictingstatus indicators are present, a serial number or date may be used todetermine which is latest.

In some cases, it is useful to create media that is only playable onspecifically authorized devices, such as those that are pre-registered.In this case, instead of providing revocation, unique media informationcan be used to enable media activation. For example, advance reviewcopies and pre-production copies generally do not need to be (and shouldnot be) playable on all players. Data recorded in the writable portioncan include decryption keys or other information specific to theauthorized recipient(s) of each piece of media. The uniquely-recordedregion can also include names, e-mail addresses, account numbers, orother data identifying the specific recipient (e.g., for forensicwatermarking purposes, interactive features, etc.) or characteristics ofthe recipient (e.g., viewing preferences, authorization data, groupidentifiers; zip codes, etc.). These fields can also be written duringor after the sale of the media, for example as an activation step thatprevents shoplifted media from being played (thereby reducing the riskof shoplifting to stores that display media on their shelves). Back-endsystems can reimburse merchants for media that is never activated, orcharge merchants for media when it is activated. Another use for thiscapability is to distribute “locked” media prior to an official releasedate, then write keys that enable playback on the writable area whenplayback is to be authorized. Information can be recorded by an entityor facility other than the one that manufactured the media, e.g. aretail facility, a shipping facility, or a security agent (e.g., if thepressing facility is not completely trusted). If end-user devices canwrite portions of the media, it is also possible to record data (such asauthorization keys, player identifiers, etc.) when the media is playedor unlocked. Writable portions on media can, for example, be used toimplement features such as “bonus” material that can be unlocked for afee then played on multiple players.

For off-line players, revocation notifications typically would bedelivered on subsequent titles. For example, new titles can carry listsof serial numbers (with accompanying authenticating data) identifyingmedia that have been revoked. If the player has adequate nonvolatilestorage (e.g., a hard drive), revocation lists can be stored by playersin their entirety. Otherwise, the revocation data can be checked againstthe player's insertion history and/or nonvolatile memory slots todetermine whether any media that have been played by the player arerevoked. If so, the corresponding revocation data is stored in theplayer's nonvolatile memory. With this approach, pirated “clone” mediawill play the first time it is inserted, but will become revoked (orotherwise “flagged”) when a piece of media is inserted that revokes thepirated media. In general, media revocation is valuable because it makespirated media less attractive to consumers than legitimate media.

Media activation/revocation can be used to implement a variety ofpromotional and security features. For example, a movie may be sold withmultiple media containing different versions (e.g., wide-screen,pan-scan, Directors' cut, etc.) To prevent people from selling orrenting such media separately, their content code can verify that one ormore other media are represented in the player's nonvolatile memory.Optionally, the other media can also be required to have been insertedrecently (e.g., within a certain amount of time or a certain number ofincrements to slot write counter 447/448). As another option, the mediacan also require that the user insert another piece of media duringplayback (e.g., by loading a key value from the other media). Apromotion can be created where users are given access to bonus materialif they have played certain combinations of other media. Of course,playback decisions also be linked to other information, such ascharacteristics of the player and/or playback environment.

Players with on-line capabilities can check the revocation status of thecurrently-inserted title, as well as other titles represented in theplayer's media insertion history and/or nonvolatile memory slots. Thischeck can be implemented in content code or can be performed by players.On-line checks can also be used to detect the case where multipleplayers are simultaneously playing a single piece of media (e.g.,indicating that the media has been pirated) or an excessive number ofplayers have used a particular piece of media (e.g., indicating that ithas been rented in violation of a license agreement).

Pirates may try to bypass revocation checks by modifying the content'scode. In this case, subsequent portions of the code (e.g., code executedlater during playback) can detect the modification, for example byrepeating the check or by re-loading and verifying portions of the mediacontaining the verification code. Revocation check results can also beintegrated with decryption processes.

Of course, variations on the media revocation approach can be employed.For example, players can store digitally-signed interpreted codeconfigured to identify revoked media. These code snippets can beexecuted each time media is inserted to determine whether thenewly-inserted title is revoked. Titles would be able to storerevocation checking code (preferably with corresponding digitalsignatures that would be verified by players), which the player wouldretain for checking future media. Media revocation checking can also beperformed by code in the player's ROM, for example by storing in theplayer's nonvolatile memory a table of revoked optical discs' sectornumbers and hash values. If media is writable, the content may alsostore and obtain revocation data on the media itself (or may store dataof any other kind and purpose on the media, such as user preferences,user information, etc.).

Media may also be used to carry revocation data about recording devices.For example, if consumer recording devices are configured to placeidentifying data on their recordings, player devices can maintainrecords of revoked recorders. These records may be updated by revocationdata carried on media. Recordable media can also be manufactured withinformation identifying revoked recorders to prevent revoked recordersfrom writing to the media. Revocation-related data fields may becryptographically authenticated, for example to prevent malicious orinadvertent revocation of legitimate devices. For example, theidentifying data placed by recording devices may include a recorderdigital certificate and a digital signature on a media serial number.Identifying data placed on recordable media may be encrypted (forexample with the public key of a third-party agent) to protect theprivacy of users. Threshold cryptography may also be employed, forexample to require multiple media to identify a recording device. (Notethat threshold cryptography may also be employed in other aspects of thetechnologies disclosed herein, for example with forensic marks to ensurethat a certain amount of copied material is required to recover themark.)

One other use for media revocation is to provide an additional deterrentagainst casual piracy in addition to other approaches that areavailable. The data embedded in forensic watermarks can identifyprevious media played by a device. Depending on implementation choice,it may be advantageous to revoke other media whose IDs were determinedfrom a pirate copy's forensic watermarks, revoke recordable media whoseserial numbers are close to those used to distribute pirated material,require additional authorization steps prior to the playback fromquestionable media, etc.

Miscellaneous Features and Capabilities

Security Over-Ride Keys: Content can be designed such that players withknowledge of a security over-ride key can bypass some or all securitychecks, allowing access to part or all of the content. By supportingsuch keys, content owners can grant access to limited portions of a work(e.g., if a jurisdiction required that content owners grant critics“fair use” access to video on a frame-by-frame basis). These over-ridekeys can also be used to “release” content from its protected form, forexample if protection features are designed poorly (creating playabilityproblems). If desired, these keys may be escrowed with a third party (orstored on the media encrypted with the third party's public key).Over-ride keys can also be schedule to be released when copyrightsexpire, e.g. to address concerns that anti-piracy mechanisms mightprevent content from entering the public domain.

Multiple Round Collusion Analysis: In some situations, a determinedadversary might combine output from a large number of devices in anattempt to prevent recovery of forensic watermarks. If an adversary hascompromised so many devices that content is unable to identify theoffending devices directly, it is possible to combine forensicinformation gathered from multiple content releases. For example, theinformation gathered from a first title may narrow the range of possibledevices being used by the adversary, but not uniquely identify alloffending devices. This knowledge may be used when a second title ismastered to create forensic watermarks that will provide furtherinformation about the attackers and/or their equipment. This process maybe repeated until the adversaries have been uniquely identified.

Countermeasures to Malicious Interpreters: Malicious players may bedesigned to try to recognize security-related code in content. Forexample, a malicious player might attempt to identify where RSAsignature verification operations are being performed by content andmodify the results, e.g. to make an invalid RSA signature appear to bevalid. If such players are produced, content owners can author newcontent to use different RSA signature computation routines thatdesigned to evade this identification. Examples of operations that maybe used include, without limitation: rewriting code to avoid unreliableoperations; obfuscating code; message blinding; checking trialcomputations to detect attacks; and integrating intermediates and/orresults with other cryptographic operations (such as decryption steps).

Interactivity: The virtual machine/interpreter may be for non-securitytasks as well as security purposes. For example, content code can beused to display menus, text, graphics, animations, user interfaceelements, etc. to the user. Similarly, the content can receive usercommands or responses, including without limitation mouse-inputs (e.g.,movements, clicks), button presses (such as keyboard or remote controlinputs), light pen inputs, and joystick actions. Information about thelocal player (such as camera inputs, microphones inputs, changes inpositions of users' bodies, etc.) may also be gathered and used, forexample, to control the playback. Players can also provide features toassist with user interface implementation, including without limitationthe ability to display dialog boxes, manage display windows, conductvoice recognition, manage user preferences, etc. As a deterrent topiracy, code implementing interactive user features can be combined withsecurity code, such that adversaries cannot readily separate one fromthe other.

Audit trail management: The player may provide APIs for audit trailmanagement, enabling content to maintain records of sequences of eventsin a manner that can be authenticated (e.g., by a third party, othercontent, future invocations of the content, etc.). Audit records can,without limitation, be secured using digital signatures (optionally withserial numbers based on a counter stored in the player), messageauthentication codes, hash chains, and hash trees. For applicationsrequiring completeness of audit trails (e.g., to prevent deletion ofpay-per-view purchase records), the current audit state may bemaintained by the player. Audit record data may be stored within theplayer (e.g., in NVRAM slots managed by content, a file on a hard disk,a separate flash memory area, etc.) or externally (e.g., on anintermittently-connected network, writable portions of media, smartcards, etc.). If the local audit storage is full or if other criteriaare met (e.g., the user has purchased substantial amounts ofpay-per-view material), the player and/or content can require a networkconnection to a trusted external device or server, which can retrieveaudit data and provide cryptographically-assured authorization to purgeaudit records. Examples of specific audit management operations whichmay be supported (and which may be provided by code delivered withcontent and/or players and/or devices accessible to players) includewithout limitation: submitting data for inclusion in audit trails,verifying the position and/or content of data purportedly in an audittrail, producing cryptographically-verifiable evidence that certain datais represented in an audit trail (or is a complete representation of atleast a portion of an audit trail), secure storage of audit records(e.g., using encryption to prevent unauthorized code or parties fromdetermine audit record contents) searching audit trails, and purgingaudit trails (e.g., after verifying a cryptographically-authenticatedauthorization). Auditing may also be implemented by the content itself(e.g., using hash-based slot authentication), or using separatecapabilities/APIs. Although cryptographic authentication is generallypreferable for audit data, this is not required.

Accessing and Exchanging Content Over Networks

Although most consumer video and audio content is currently distributedon optical media, the popularity of streaming downloads is predicted toincrease over time. The security measures presented herein can beredesigned to support streaming or locally-cached content instead of, orin addition to, physical media. Instead of loading data from mediaphysically located at the player, the content code and data areretrieved over a network. For example, instead of issuing procedurecalls requesting data sectors from media, the content would issueprocedure calls requesting data over a network. Unlike passive media, aremote server can itself have processing capabilities, e.g. allowing itto send requests to the content (e.g., to have the player performcryptographic operations) and validate the results. Security protocolsfor protecting data exchanged over networks (including withoutlimitation SSL) can be implemented in the content's code or in theplayer (or other components).

A simple server implementation would receive incoming requests fromvalidated users (e.g., those who have paid for access to the content),read the corresponding data from its own local storage, and deliver theresult. A more sophisticated server can select and/or modify the data inreal time, for example to embed forensic watermarks, and interact withother servers. Servers can also store information about or on behalf ofremote players (e.g., as an alternative to player-based nonvolatilememory), deliver security code customized for the end user, performreal-time revocation checks, automatically insert security upgrades intocontent, provide Internet/web proxy capabilities, and supply otherservices to content code. For example, an exemplary transaction includesthe following steps: (a) a content server receives a purchase requestfrom an end user's player; (b) the content server verifies the payment;(c) the content server transmits a portion of interpretable codeconfigured to analyze the functional and/or security properties of theuser's player; (d) the user's player runs the interpreted code andreturns information about its properties; (e) the content serveranalyzes the response and transmits security verification logic (whichincludes interpreted and/or native code, and may be custom-generated) tothe user's player; (f) the user's player processes the verificationlogic and returns a response to the server; (g) the server validates theresponse; (h) the content server transmits (e.g., streams) encrypteddigital content (e.g., audio, video, and/or images) to the user'splayer; and (i) the user's player decrypts the content (where correctoperation of the decryption process may require correct keys or resultsfrom the security verification logic).

The server process can itself be controlled by interpreted code,optionally using the same interpreter architecture (e.g., DLX) as theplayer side. This has the benefit that content can be authored withoutregard for the server's physical hardware architecture. For home networkenvironments, this is a particularly attractive model, since thesecurity and decoding “intelligence” remain at the server, while contentcan be streamed out to authenticated local devices. Similarly, forcontent that will be streamed over a variety of different Internetservices, server-side interpreters can allow content to be authored onceand streamed from any compatible service.

In some cases, a recipient device may also possess the ability to makeits own security decisions, such as in the case where a receiving devicewishes to cache content and later transmit it to subsequent deviceswhose identity is not known during the initial transfer. In this case,the initial transfer may include interpretable and/or nativelyexecutable code for use by the recipient device in making itssecurity-related decisions. It is not necessary that that all devicessupport the same interpreter or programmable technologies, as the coderun by the transmitting device does not necessarily have to be the sameas the code by the receiving device.

In some situations, multiple servers and/or content transfers may beinvolved. For example, content may include security code obtained frommultiple entities, including (for example) servers operated by bothplayer manufacturers and content owners. In some personal computerenvironments, it may also be useful to use multiple interpreters. Forexample, interpreters may be included in the media interface (e.g., anoptical disc drive), the operating system, the application software(e.g., the player), output devices (e.g., an amplifier), etc.Alternatively or in addition, cryptographic oracles may also be providedin components.

Additional Considerations and Variations

In an exemplary embodiment, content can be customized for specificplayers. In this case, the content is playable only on a single playeror small number of players, but code that is not required for playbackon the recipient device(s) does not need to be transmitted. Thus, thisapproach is of particular value when it is difficult, expensive, or slowto send information to users, e.g. if storage space is limited or of thecontent must be sent over a slow network connection. The content canstill, however, query the player to verify that the playback environmentis suitably secure.

To ensure that playback is not interrupted or distorted, it can behelpful to require specific minimum performance standards for theplayers' interpreters.

In an exemplary embodiment, the systems and methods can be configured toallow content to be exchanged from one device to another. The specificsecurity characteristics of such exchanges depend factors such aswhether on-line communication with a trusted (e.g., publisher-operated)server is available. The form in which the content is transferreddepends on the security policies enforced by the content and thedevices' hardware capabilities. For example, in one embodiment whereboth devices include secure interpreters, the sending device transmitsthe raw encrypted content (as stored on the original media or encryptedwith another key, optionally with watermarks included) along with codefor controlling the playback. The playback control code can becustomized by the sending device for the recipient device. In anothercase, the sending device may verify that the security characteristics ofthe output port and destination device are acceptable, negotiate ashared key with the destination device, decrypt and watermark thecontent, re-encrypt the content with the shared key, and send there-encrypted content to the destination.

Players with adequate nonvolatile storage can be used to storeupdateable code that is called from the interpreter. For example, theplayer can be configured to always store the latest security code for aparticular publisher. In this case, if a newer version of the securitycode is encountered, the old version will be updated (e.g., afterverifying a digital signature on the new code). In this way, oldercontent can benefit from security updates carried on new content. (Thisapproach can, for example, be implemented using the secure memory methoddescribed previously.) In another embodiment, content can require thatplayers include current security updates by obtaining the currentdate/time from the player and comparing against the date/time of thelatest known security upgrade. In this manner, content can ensure thatplayers have reasonably up-to-date security upgrades.

In general, content protection systems should avoid playing any visiblerole in legitimate actions by legitimate users. Nevertheless, some userinterface elements are necessary, such as for reporting errors orproviding information. In the case where content can select betweenmultiple supported output qualities (e.g., a “legacy” quality if theplayer provides inadequate security and a “high” quality if security issatisfactory), an indicator can be useful to notify the user of theoutput quality. For example, in one embodiment, a green light emittingdiode (LED) under the control of the content indicates that output is ofhigh-quality (i.e., the security is satisfactory), an orange LEDindicates reduced quality (i.e., marginal security), and a blinking redLED can indicates that no output is provided because the player isrevoked. In another embodiment, a brief spoken or written notice (in theuser's language, if known) is provided to report the status of thesecurity. The decision whether to report and/or use the higher qualityversus the lower quality output can be based on other factors, such asthe presence and/or absence of a robust and/or fragile watermark. Ifnecessary, a degradation module can be included with the player toenable the content to reduce the quality of playback (e.g., to thequality of a legacy format) for security or other reasons. (Degradationmodules can, for example, be included to convert high-definitiontelevision signals to NTSC-resolution or to convert high-resolutionmulti-channel audio into 2-channel CD-quality audio.)

If the media interface and player interpreter offer adequateperformance, bulk decryption and watermark embedding can be handled inthe interpreter instead of in a separate decryption module. Allowing thecontent to decrypt itself directly can provide some security benefits,such as ensuring that attackers will not mount attacks against thedecryption module. If the interpreter performance is adequate, it isalso possible to implement the content decompression in the interpreteras well, avoiding the need to standardize a single player Codec type.

While implementation using an interpreter is preferable on platforms(such as personal computers) that do not have specific hardware supportfor the techniques and systems disclosed herein, it is possible toimplement many of the interpreter functions in dedicated hardware.Depending on the application, dedicated implementations may have cost orpower consumption savings, although provide reduced functionality.

Embodiments that receive content on physical media can use virtually anymedia format. While optical discs (such as CD and DVD) provide highstorage densities at low cost, other storage systems can also beemployed, including without limitation magnetic media, holographicmemories, battery-backed RAM, ROM, EEPROM, and flash memory. The storagecapacity of the media can be used for storing data of many differenttypes, including information related to the techniques and systemsdisclosed herein (such as executable programs that implement decodingmethods for various computer platforms, content protected using methodsdisclosed herein, etc.) as well as data that is not directly related tothe techniques and systems disclosed herein (such as unrelatedexecutable programs, unprotected content such as Red Book CD audio,content protected using other security schemes, etc.).

Media can include tamper-resistant circuitry for performingcryptographic computations to enable players to verify that the media isnot an unauthorized copy. Although such capabilities are simplest toimplement for media that use electrical interfaces, even optical mediacan include cryptographic capabilities. For example, a contactlesscryptographic module (such as the contactless smart card of U.S. Pat.No. 5,640,306 to Gaumet et al.) can be affixed to or embedded in anoptical disc. While cryptographic media authentication is preferable,other authentication mechanisms can be employed instead. For example,general media authentication methods known in the background art includewriting serial numbers to difficult-to-copy locations (such as regionsthat are not writeable using commercially recordable media or drives)and including a digitally-signed “description” of variouscharacteristics of the original physical media. Of course, cryptographicmechanisms offer the advantage that, even if attackers discover methodsfor compromising existing media, future media can be issued withimproved security without requiring any changes to the player.

Because many consumers already have an investment in content on legacyformats, players implementing the techniques and systems disclosedherein may be configured to support these legacy formats. Similarly,different versions of the interpreter may be supported by a particularplayer. In this case, the player needs to analyze the media or contentto identify the appropriate security system to use. For example, adigital video player might detect whether the disc is a legacy DVD usingCSS (and, if so, select a CSS decryption system) or is a DVD using thetechniques and systems disclosed herein (and, if so, activate alanguage-based decryption system). Robust watermarks included in thecontent can be used to detect if content that was originally protectedwith one security system has been copied to a format lacking theoriginal protections. For example, content that does not allow copyingcould include a watermark to indicate that any devices that encounter acopy in any other format (e.g., in an unprotected format) can recognizethe copy as unauthorized and (for example) refuse playback.

The techniques and systems disclosed herein can be used with a widevariety of content types, including without limitation audio, stillimages, video, 3-dimensional images, and 3-dimensional video.

The techniques and systems disclosed herein can also be implemented in avariety physical devices. If only one device is responsible fordecrypting content, it is preferable to have security policies enforcedby that device. However, output devices and intermediate processingdevices (such an audio equalizer or mixer), can also benefit from thetechniques and systems disclosed herein and/or by providing querycapabilities that can be used by such techniques and systems to verifytheir security. In one embodiment, a home entertainment serverdownloads, stores, and manages content, and forwards content to playbackdevices (speakers, headphones, video displays, etc.) whose security hasbeen successfully verified. Connections to these devices are encrypted,preferably under the joint control of the techniques and systemsdisclosed herein and the destination device, to prevent theft of contentin transit.

1. A computer-implemented method comprising: using a processor in amedia player to receive data comprising both digital content and dataprocessing instructions corresponding to the digital content, thereceived data being received from a source external to the media player,the received data being storable in a memory of the media player;executing the data processing instructions from the memory by using acomputer language interpreter of the media player, the data processinginstructions, when executed by the computer language interpreter,configuring the computer language interpreter to: interrogate a playbackenvironment of the media player, the data processing instructionsfurther configured to perform a security check that interrogates theplayback environment of the media player and to verify at least one of:a media player device identifier, including at least one of a playerserial number, specific subscriber information, a player model, or aplayer software version, and a user identity, including at least one ofa user name, geographical region, email address, or a web address, thedata processing instructions further configured to reduce output qualityif a result of the interrogation of the playback environment isuncertain; query one or more countermeasure routines stored in thememory of the media player, the countermeasure routines collectivelymitigating security weaknesses in multiple models of the media player,the countermeasure routines including cryptographic data and executableinstructions for performing cryptographic operations, the computerlanguage interpreter not having access to the memory in which thecountermeasure routines are stored; and request execution of acountermeasure routine by the computer language interpreter.
 2. Thecomputer-implemented method as claimed in claim 1 wherein thecountermeasure routines being from the group: code obfuscation routines,code encryption routines, code rewriting routines, and intermediateresult integration routines.
 3. The computer-implemented method asclaimed in claim 1 wherein the countermeasure routine being configuredto perform a plurality of security checks, and the data processinginstructions being configured to permit playback of the content providedthat the plurality of security checks is successful.
 4. Thecomputer-implemented method as claimed in claim 1 wherein the dataprocessing instructions being configured to decrypt the digital contentby using a cryptographic key contained in the media player.
 5. Thecomputer-implemented method as claimed in claim 1 wherein thecountermeasure routine being configured to detect whether security ofthe media player has been compromised.
 6. The computer-implementedmethod as claimed in claim 1 wherein the countermeasure routine beingconfigured to correct a vulnerability in the media player.
 7. Thecomputer-implemented method as claimed in claim 1 including maintainingan audit trail for tracking processing performed on the media player. 8.A media player comprising: a memory; a media interface; and a processorto receive data comprising both digital content and data processinginstructions corresponding to the digital content, the received databeing received from a source external to the media player via the mediainterface, the received data being storable in the memory of the mediaplayer, the processor being further configured to execute the dataprocessing instructions from the memory by using a computer languageinterpreter of the media player, the data processing instructions, whenexecuted by the computer language interpreter, configuring the computerlanguage interpreter to: interrogate a playback environment of the mediaplayer, the data processing instructions further configured to perform asecurity check that interrogates the playback environment of the mediaplayer and to verify at least one of: a media player device identifier,including at least one of a player serial number, specific subscriberinformation, a player model, or a player software version, and a useridentity, including at least one of a user name, geographical region,email address, or a web address, the data processing instructionsfurther configured to reduce output quality if a result of theinterrogation of the playback environment is uncertain; query one ormore countermeasure routines stored in the memory of the media player,the countermeasure routines collectively mitigating security weaknessesin multiple models of the media player, the countermeasure routinesincluding cryptographic data and executable instructions for performingcryptographic operations, the computer language interpreter not havingaccess to the memory in which the countermeasure routines are stored;and request execution of a countermeasure routine by the computerlanguage interpreter.
 9. The media player as claimed in claim 8 whereinthe countermeasure routines being from the group: code obfuscationroutines, code encryption routines, code rewriting routines, andintermediate result integration routines.
 10. The media player asclaimed in claim 8 wherein the countermeasure routine being configuredto perform a plurality of security checks, and the data processinginstructions being configured to permit playback of the content providedthat the plurality of security checks is successful.
 11. The mediaplayer as claimed in claim 8 wherein the data processing instructionsbeing configured to decrypt the digital content by using a cryptographickey contained in the media player.
 12. The media player as claimed inclaim 8 wherein the countermeasure routine being configured to detectwhether security of the media player has been compromised.
 13. The mediaplayer as claimed in claim 8 wherein the countermeasure routine beingconfigured to correct a vulnerability in the media player.
 14. The mediaplayer as claimed in claim 8 including maintaining an audit trail fortracking processing performed on the media player.